THE MIND OF THE SPIRIT
Paul's Approach to Transformed Thinking
CRAIG S. KEENER
For our beloved children, David and Keren
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Introduction

Pauline scholars have rightly explored at great length Paul’s soteriology, Christology, and pneumatology and his views of Israel and Scripture. Yet even among the fewer discussions of Pauline anthropology, very rarely have scholars devoted extensive attention to his view of the mind,¹ especially in a way that explains how he may have shaped his language to communicate to his contemporaries.

More recent insights into this subject by scholars conversant in ancient philosophy, such as Stanley Stowers and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, have not always been incorporated into exegetical or theological discussions to the extent that their contributions merit.² I hope that subsequent interpreters will take more account of their contributions (and mine), although further research will undoubtedly draw on a wider range of sources and provide further nuance to our earlier discussions on these topics.

Previous interpreters have rightly emphasized the importance of believers’ righteousness in Romans, usually in terms of one’s status or relationship with God and/or in terms of moral righteousness or transformation. What interpreters have often missed, however, is how Paul uses cognition to connect these key elements. How does one move from righteous identity to righteous

1. There are exceptions, such as recently Wright, Faithfulness, 1121–26, as well as my own attempts in Keener, “Perspectives”; Keener, “Heavenly Mindedness”; Keener, “Minds.”
2. In citing them, I am not implying agreement on every point but noting that their familiarity with ancient philosophy has allowed them to recognize and approach some issues in Paul from a vantage point too often neglected by scholars. Despite his helpful insights, some scholars have reasonably questioned Engberg-Pedersen’s disproportionate dependence on Cic. Fin. 3 for reconstructing Stoicism in Paul and Stoics (see Wright, Faithfulness, 1391, 1395). I deliberately draw on a wider range of sources for Stoicism here, highlighting not only Arius Didymus’s Epitome in particular but also various Stoic writers.

Craig Keener, The Mind of the Spirit
living? Paul emphasizes the importance of a right understanding corresponding to the divine perspective—an understanding that may complement, or even more likely that functions as another aspect of, what Paul calls faith.

What This Book Addresses

Chapter 1 of this book addresses Paul’s depiction of the corrupted pagan mind in Romans 1:18–32. In this passage the supposedly wise pagan mind became subject to passions, what philosophers viewed as the antithesis of self-controlled reason, after rejecting the knowledge of God. Chapter 2 explores the new way of thinking in Christ in Romans 6:1–11: having been righted with God in God’s sight through faith, believers are now invited to share God’s perspective on their union with Christ’s death (6:11). Chapter 3 is my longest chapter, due to the major issues in Romans 7:15–25 that must be surveyed before any further exegesis may be developed. Here I revisit the fallen mind, but in this case no longer the law-uninformed pagan mind of 1:18–32. The religious mind informed by God’s righteous requirements is all the more frustrated by passions, because it knows right from wrong yet is unable to silence passion.

Chapter 4 addresses the way of thinking empowered by God’s Spirit in Romans 8:5–7. Here, those already put right with God are now depicted as motivated and empowered to serve God by the internal life of God’s Spirit. Romans 12:1–3, surveyed in chapter 5, describes the renewing of the mind according to the standards of the coming age instead of the present one. Such a mind leads one to devote one’s individual body to the service of the larger body of Christ. Chapter 6 considers the mind of Christ in 1 Corinthians 2:16 and its context: the indwelling of God’s Spirit shares with the spiritually mature—those attentive to the Spirit’s explication of the message of Christ—a measure of God’s own wisdom. Here too the Spirit offers a foretaste of eschatological reality as well as experience of God. At the end of this chapter, I briefly consider also a passage from 2 Corinthians (3:18) that sheds some light on how the Spirit enlightens our minds in Christ.

Because Paul’s Roman and Corinthian correspondence sufficiently establish his interest in cognition and the divine, I sample the theme only more briefly elsewhere. Chapter 7 more briefly surveys some of this cognitive theme in Philippians: those who entrust their worries to God can experience peace (4:6–8); a Christlike way of thinking involves serving one another (2:5); and the new mind should look to heavenly rather than earthly matters (3:19–20). Finally, chapter 8 develops the theme of the heavenly mind in Colossians 3:1–2: a focus on the enthroned Christ that transforms how believers live on earth.
What This Book Is Not Addressing

In treating passages, I omit many exegetical details and surveys of views where they are not relevant to the matter in question; the reader interested in my perspectives on such topics often may find them treated, albeit briefly, in my short commentary on Romans, which I hope to revisit in the future with a larger work. The study of cognition in Paul does not depend on any specific major debated approach to other aspects of Pauline theology, with the exception of the chapter on Romans 7.

Although Paul uses a range of words treating the concepts of thinking, understanding, and the mind, my focus here is not lexical study, which can easily be addressed today with a variety of readily available tools. Addressing the wider ancient usage of all the terms on which Paul draws is a useful exercise, but it is not the point of the present study. Although I work from the Greek text, I render words in English where possible to keep the book less cumbersome for a wider range of readers. The reader should keep in mind that Paul uses various terms in the same semantic domain even though these terms are not always consistently differentiated in English translations.

I do not propose to treat every possibly relevant passage or every detail of the passages that I address; instead, I propose a fuller treatment of particular sample passages and of how discussions of the mind among Paul’s contemporaries may inform the ways that his first audiences would have understood him. In my major exception to this rule, I address Romans 7 in greater detail because it remains a point of some controversy. I will not elaborate in later chapters points already established (or at least argued) in earlier ones, with the consequence that the book’s final two chapters will be relatively brief. My translations opening each chapter are meant only to introduce some of the issues of some key texts in question; clearly, no translation can convey all the possible nuances implied by Paul’s literary context or intellectual milieu.

Although I am interested in Paul’s theology on the matter in question, I am not staking out positions on many of the contested issues of Pauline theology.

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4. At the scholarly high end one may consult TLG; nonspecialists (as well as scholars for less-detailed work) may consult Accordance, Logos, and BibleWorks.
5. I base my own work in Paul on the Greek text but am writing in English. Those concerned about the particular terms used should consult the Greek text but also keep in mind that the wider semantic domain will be more crucial for our general purposes here than extensive lexical investigation of specific terms. This can be undertaken by concordance searches rather than the more conceptual work I have done by working through the wider range of ancient sources.
theology today. For example, the book’s primary contributions should not be affected by whether the reader supports the “new perspective” (really, perspectives) on Pauline soteriology or more traditional versions. I am trying to exegete texts fairly, which might make my approach eclectic on some points, but I have not sacrificed the space to qualify much of my language to repeatedly declare neutrality on contemporary debates. Admittedly, there are undoubtedly controversies on minor matters with which I am not yet familiar.

Too often scholars settle on a particular background for Paul’s language (e.g., Cynic or targumic) without having read more widely in ancient sources. Sometimes too they concisely classify other scholars’ works based on their focus (such as proposed rabbinic, Hellenistic Jewish, or Stoic backgrounds for Paul). By contrast, because our best sources suggest that Paul was a Judean with a Diaspora background and mission, the most helpful approach may be more eclectic, drawing on various sources where they each contribute most to particular points.

Given this book’s focus on cognitive themes in Paul, part of my attention to Paul’s context must address ancient philosophy, which shared this cognitive focus. In examining at many points a popular philosophic context for Paul, I am not claiming that Paul had a philosophic education; certainly, he did not study in a philosophic school. Nevertheless, Paul was interested in reaching urban Greek speakers in Roman Asia, Macedonia, Achaia, and Rome. The most influential people in his congregations were normally educated, which in these regions meant some exposure to philosophy (e.g., anecdotes about and sayings of philosophers), although a majority of those who received an advanced education opted to focus on rhetoric. Others, who often may have had little education (cf. 1 Cor. 1:26), nevertheless were exposed to some popular philosophy from speakers in markets and public competitions, as well as (for those who were citizens of their cities) allusions in speeches in public assemblies. Egyptian papyri take us closer to everyday village life, but common teachings of popular philosophy (if not always the technical details of various schools of philosophic thought) tell us something about the intellectual milieu for many people in the cities.

6. As is often noted by proponents, e.g., Wright, Justification, 28; Wright, Faithfulness, 1458. Likewise, critics also recognize multiple “new perspectives”; see, e.g., Waters, Justification, 154.

7. Sometimes differences can also be exaggerated. Thus, for example, Dunn (Perspective, 18–23, 28–30) notes that his focus on culturally specific issues highlighted in Romans is not meant to deny wider principles that such issues may reflect.

8. If a reader feels that I lean too far toward either the old or the new perspective for their taste, the reader can, with minimal adjustments, make my exegetical observations work within her or his own system.
For better or for worse, our best access to this thought today comes from the works that have survived. I highlight Stoicism somewhat more than other schools because it was the dominant philosophic system in this period in this region; because it influenced nonphilosophic intellectual discourse through elite education; and because it influenced popular urban thinking through the control of the educated over most public discourse.⁹ (Middle Platonism may have already held a stronger grip among Alexandrian intellectuals; its eclectic approach and other factors made it dominant more widely after Paul.)

Roman background is relevant not only in Rome but also in Corinth and Philippi, both heavily romanized colonies. In both locations, however, the message about Jesus probably circulated first among Greek-speaking Jews, making Greek and Jewish contexts (not least Hellenistic Jewish contexts) no less relevant. I draw here on as wide a range of potentially relevant background as possible, while acknowledging (with other historians of antiquity) that it usually is not possible to provide parallels for the exact city and decade that Paul was addressing.

I provide here exegetical samples for Paul’s approach to the renewed mind and do not claim to treat all undisputed Pauline texts. I have given even less attention here to the theme in disputed Pauline literature. I personally do accept the Pauline authorship of Ephesians, but insights there would not alter significantly the results of this study. I treat Colossians here as Pauline, but those who demur will at least find my brief treatment of Colossians 3:1–2 relevant to early developments of Pauline thought, developments that cohere naturally, in a Diaspora context, with the undisputed Pauline works.

I respect Luke’s depiction of Paul more highly than do some other Acts scholars; my respect stems not from ignorance of critical scholarship (as critics sometimes suppose must be true of all who do not share their convictions) but from detailed research.¹⁰ The present work has little occasion to draw on Acts, but suffice it to say that Luke’s general portrayal of Paul as a skilled, literate, and brilliant thinker is consistent with what we find in Paul’s own letters. Luke’s Paul, like the letters’ Paul, apparently experienced no conflict as a believer between life in the Spirit and an intellect directed by faith.¹¹

⁹. Cf. here, e.g., Brookins, “Wise Corinthians.”
¹⁰. See Keener, Acts, 4 vols. (esp. the samples in vol. 1, chap. 7). I believe that my work on Acts stands in the mainstream of Acts scholarship but hope that even those who are more skeptical will recognize the level of research in the commentary, which cites tens of thousands of primary references from antiquity.
¹¹. For fuller discussion of this point, see Keener, “Teaching Ministry.” For the Lukan Paul’s rhetorical sophistication, see Keener, “Rhetorical Techniques”; for his claim of a sober mind, see Keener, “Madness.” For Luke’s portrayal of Paul’s education before he became a follower of
Implications for Theological Reflection in Today’s Church

Modern thinkers have much to learn from ancient ones, sometimes even the seeds of modern thought. For Christians, Paul’s works are seminal and offer many insights for subsequent issues in the church. Some divisions that many modern readers assume are biblical in fact stem from postbiblical discussions.

The Reformation, in which scholars figured prominently, emphasized disciplined study of the biblical text. Not everyone had access to scholarly training and resources, however, and many other people of faith (including many Anabaptists, later Pietists, participants in North American frontier revivals, early African-American religion, early Pentecostalism, etc.) particularly highlighted dependence on the Spirit. Some circles have succeeded better than others at bringing together these sorts of emphases—for example, some of the early church fathers, many medieval monasteries, Jonathan Edwards, and John Wesley.

Nevertheless, at least among modern Protestants there sometimes remain serious divisions among those who emphasize the academic heritage of the Reformation and those who emphasize the heritage of some subsequent revival movements. (Among Catholics, different monastic orders have also tended to value different emphases, although such differences are undoubtedly less pronounced today than in the past.)

In principle, most of us would affirm the value of both exploring the biblical text cognitively and embracing the Spirit experientially; the biblical text invites such experience, and without the objective constraints of Scripture, experience can quickly lose its Christocentric mooring. But each Christian tradition has its own predilections, each has focused on some different yet genuine biblical emphases, and each therefore has something valuable to learn from the other. We need both Word and Spirit; for Paul, certainly, the two are inextricably bound together. This book will argue that, against some circles, the Spirit does in fact often work through the mind and not only apart from it.

Sometimes the dichotomy is less about the human mind versus God’s Spirit and more about the differences between the human mind and the human spirit. Yet, as whole persons, we need to cultivate both the cognitive and affective aspects of our humanity to fully honor the Lord (cf., for example, Paul’s interest in both aspects in 1 Cor. 14:15). Some of us naturally gravitate
toward churches that emphasize rational exposition, and others of us toward churches that engage the emotions with rousing preaching, celebratory worship, or, in some more sacramental circles, the touch and sometimes smell of worship. Many of us undoubtedly feel torn and wish that more of our churches engaged both the mind and the spirit. Some may have already found churches that do both to their satisfaction.

Unfortunately, circles persist that value only one or the other approach to God, often despising the other as either irrational or unspiritual. Citing the Spirit bearing witness with our spirit (Rom. 8:16), some circles highlight our spirit as an organ of God’s Spirit in a way that they deem impossible for the mind. Some other circles almost substitute rational exegetical or theological skill for any other means of hearing God’s voice. Each of these two extremes often views the other approach to God with suspicion. Many of the rest of us simply feel more comfortable one way or the other without needing to denigrate those whose predilections differ. As a charismatic scholar, I feel comfortable embracing God’s transformation of both mind and spirit, although my own gifts and calling have often inclined my focus more toward the former. This book focuses more on affirming the value of the cognitive side, but biblically God works with both.

Another area in which Paul’s discussion of cognition raises questions concerns how to explain it in language more widely intelligible today. Paul communicated in the common language of his day, language that does not easily align with today’s psychological terminologies. For that matter, both the psychologizing philosophers of Paul’s day and the range of philosophic and psychological schools today often vary in their understanding and terminology from one school to another.

12. Personality types sometimes make us better fitted for some environments than others; some individuals are more constitutionally (and sometimes environmentally) suited for analysis, for example, and some flourish most in a highly relational setting. As long as we appreciate other gifts and are willing to grow in our own weaker areas, our differences on these points may be complementary rather than contradictory. By way of illustration, I scored as an INFJ on the Myers-Briggs personality test, but (apart from being an extreme introvert) on some points just barely. I cannot easily play some aspects of my personality off against others; that concern presumably plays a role in how I approach this subject. As students of hermeneutics have long emphasized (e.g., Bultmann, “Exegesis”; Thiselton, “New Hermeneutic,” 86), our past experiences influence our perceptions.

13. As discussed in chap. 4, however, the same context also addresses the “mind of the Spirit” (Rom. 8:5–7). Paul calls praying in tongues prayer with one’s “spirit” (1 Cor. 14:2, 14), a valuable gift from God; but the same context seems to identify the gift of interpreting prayer in tongues as praying with the understanding (14:13–15). Paul already identified both tongues and interpretation as gifts inspired by the Spirit (12:7, 10); prayer with the understanding in this way, then, is also prayer inspired by God’s Spirit. Elsewhere in early Christianity, worship “in Spirit and in truth” probably refers not to the human spirit but to God’s Spirit (so, e.g., Scott, Spirit, 196; Keener, John, 615–19; pace, e.g., Morris, John, 270; Collins, “Spirit”).

Craig Keener, The Mind of the Spirit
Introduction

I hope that clarifying some of Paul’s psychology in this book will provide Christian psychologists and counselors better ways to articulate his principles in their own language. I hope also that through translating these principles we may learn to understand and apply Paul’s wisdom in new contexts. That objective, however, must be followed through in subsequent research cooperating between these disciplines; it is simply too far-reaching and too interdisciplinary to be achieved adequately in this book alone.
The Corrupted Mind
(Rom. 1:18–32)

Just as they did not judge it fitting to have God in their cognitive purview, God delivered them over to a mind that was unfit, so they would do things that should not be done.

—Romans 1:28

In the first chapter of Romans, Paul addresses the corrupted mind of the Gentile world; he will address the more knowledgeable Jewish mind in Romans 7:7–25. Ancient thinkers regularly opposed reason to the passions: the wise would overcome passions through truth. In Romans 1:18–32 Paul paints a more complicated picture of reason and passions, one that fits Jewish condemnations of paganism.¹

In this passage Paul argues that humanity irrationally distorted God’s image through idolatry and that God in turn expressed his wrath against this idolatry by handing them over to their own irrational desires. Unreasonable thinking

¹. I use “pagan” not to designate a set of religious views but to communicate the essential perspective that most early Jews and Christians held concerning most non-Jews, especially polytheists.
led to humanity’s subjection to passion. People’s unfit ways of thinking are the consequence of their rejection of God’s truth.\(^2\)

**The Pagan World’s Corrupted Mind**

To establish that all humanity needs Christ, Paul first establishes what was probably not actually in dispute among believers in Jesus: that the Gentile world (i.e., unconverted non-Jews) did not know God (cf. Gal. 4:8; 1 Thess. 4:5). This premise will prepare for Paul’s argument that the possession of the Torah, a revelation far superior to what the Gentiles possessed, does not guarantee that Paul’s own Jewish people know God adequately either (cf. Rom. 2:1–29). Indeed, it merely makes them more culpable, so that all humanity stands under sin (Rom. 3:9–20).

**Summary of Paul’s Likely Argument**

Paul’s argument in Romans 1:18–32, in summary, appears to run as follows: God judges humanity for their wicked action of suppressing and perverting the truth about him through idolatry (1:18, 23). Humanity is culpable for their false images of God because in creation—especially in humans, created in God’s image—God has revealed what he is like (1:19–20). God therefore judges humanity by handing them over to their own corrupted thinking (1:24, 26, 28). This wrong thinking probably includes distorting the image of God in themselves (1:24–27). As they have dishonored God (1:21), God has allowed them to dishonor each other (1:24) with what Paul calls “dishonorable” and “shameful” passions (1:26–27). In the end they have committed all kinds of sins, even though they ultimately know better (1:28–32).

Although worded in various ways, the language of reason, knowledge, and truth pervades this passage, explaining that pagans’ current irrationally immoral “mind” or “way of thinking” (1:28) stems from humanity’s own sinful choices. Such language includes the following elements: Humanity originally had enough knowledge about God to honor him (1:19–21); by finding imaginative ways around that truth, they willfully distorted it (1:21, 25). Their reasoning became void and empty, like the idols they made; their hearts, now lacking understanding, were darkened (1:21). They became foolish—even while claiming to be wise (1:21–22; cf. 1:14). They no longer approved true knowledge about God, so God gave them disapproved minds so they would do what was improper (1:28). Just as humanity initially knew enough that

\(^2\) Cf. also minds alienated from God in Eph. 2:3; 4:18; Col. 1:21.
they should have honored God, they also knew enough to understand that their wicked treatment of God and others—who, like themselves, were all created in God’s image—merited judgment (1:32). Nevertheless, they chose to justify rather than to reject such behavior (1:32). Thus they rejected truth, and God punished them by allowing them to become incapable of discerning truth, not only theologially but morally as well.

Paul’s depiction of the culpable Gentile world under sin fits one line of Jewish thought about Gentiles and prepares for his larger argument about all of humanity being under sin (2:1–3:31). Gentiles lack the fuller moral truth of God’s Torah; Paul will argue in chapter 7 that even that knowledge cannot transform fully. My focus in this chapter, however, is more specifically on Paul’s depiction of Gentile thinking ruled by, and sometimes justifying, passion.

An Early Jewish Analogy

The intellectual elements of Paul’s argument should have been intelligible to a Diaspora Jewish audience and therefore probably to an early Christian audience, whether Jewish, Gentile, or mixed, many of whose inherited beliefs had been formed in a Diaspora Jewish milieu. Most scholars acknowledge that Paul develops existing Hellenistic Jewish arguments in this section.

Paul’s argument follows most closely the popular Wisdom of Solomon. Wisdom declares that truth about God is evident in creation (Wis. 13:1–9); people, however, have failed to infer that truth from the good things that are visible (13:1). Thus, they ended up reducing God’s rightful glory by worshiping images of humans or beasts (13:13–14), images of created things (13:10–14:1;
14:8, 11). Once introduced, idolatry grew increasingly worse (14:15–16), and it has led to other vices (14:22–24). These moral consequences include sexual sin (14:12, 24) and have climaxed in a number of vices (14:25–26).

Like Paul, the author of Wisdom of Solomon notes the intellectual element in humanity’s folly. Idols deceived the ignorant (Wis. 14:18), and idolatry led people astray from the knowledge of God (14:22). Such images, or idols, revealed that people harbored wrong thinking about God (14:30). Paul, however, condemns Gentiles even more harshly than Wisdom of Solomon does, by emphasizing that Gentiles knew the truth and were not simply ignorant (Rom. 1:20–21, 32). Paul’s argument may presuppose an element of corporate guilt in that some earlier Gentiles made truth less accessible to later generations; while Paul might expect his ideal audience to share his knowledge of this element of the biblical narrative, however, he does not address such explanations. He is establishing a premise for his following argument in Romans 2, not writing a complete essay on salvation history.

God’s Wrath against Idolaters

In Romans 1:18–23 God is angry (1:18) with those who suppress the obvious truth about him and substitute false and inferior conceptions of deity in place of the truth (1:19–23). Paul views this deliberate ignorance in both moral and intellectual terms.

Although it becomes most explicit in 1:23, Paul is probably challenging idolatry throughout 1:18–23. In principle, Paul’s language of “ungodliness” or “impiety” (ἀσέβεια, 1:18) could refer to any action hostile toward a deity, and some thinkers viewed ignorance—especially about the right way to serve

10. For idolatry as foolish, see also Jub. 36:5; Wis. 11:15; 14:11; condemning the “wisdom” of idolatry, see Let. Aris. 137.
12. The meaning of Paul’s euphemistic circumlocution “from heaven” was likely obvious enough to ancient hearers; see, e.g., Dan. 4:26; 1 En. 6:2; 1 Macc. 3:18–19, 50, 60; 3 Macc. 4:21; Luke 15:18; m. Ab. 1:3; Sipra Behuq. pq. 6.267.2.1. On periphrasis, see, e.g., Rhet. Her. 4.32.43; Hermog. Method 8 (esp. 8.421–23); Rowe, “Style,” 127; Anderson, Glossary, 102. For euphemism, cf. Hermog. Inv. 4.11.200–201; Pesiq. Rab Kab. 4:2; Anderson, Glossary, 60; Tal, “Euphemisms.” For avoiding anthropomorphisms already in the LXX, see Gard, Method, esp. 32–46. For divine wrath from heaven, see, e.g., 1 En. 83:9; 91:7; Sib. Or. 1.165.
13. E.g., Dio Chrys. Or. 32.80; Arius Did. 2.7.11k, p. 84.4–6, 11–12, 21–22.
the gods—as impiety. Paul is not thinking in merely general terms, however. The climactic sin in this paragraph is idolatry (1:23). In this context the truth that people have suppressed unjustly (1:18) is the truth about God (1:19–21), and they especially suppressed this truth by worshiping created things rather than the creator (1:23, 25).

Some Greek philosophers rejected the notion of divine wrath, but other Gentiles thought differently. Jewish sources certainly acknowledge God’s wrath, including in response to idolatry. In the context of Romans 1:24–32, God expresses this wrath in the present (1:18) by handing humanity over to their own moral insanity (see discussion below).

**Information about God in Creation**

Paul treats faith as accepting divine truth, and the rebellion of sin as the result of deliberately rejecting divine truth (Rom. 1:16–18). Thus, as God’s righteousness is revealed for salvation in the good news about Jesus (1:16–17), it apparently is also revealed in just wrath against those who suppress the truth (1:18). This observation contrasts not only salvation with wrath but also faith (1:16–17) with suppression of the truth (1:18), suggesting that what Paul means by “faith” is, in contrast to some applications of the English term in recent centuries, simply embracing the divine truth.

14. Esp. Stoics, e.g., Arius Did. 2.7.5b12, p. 26.12–15; 2.7.11k, p. 84.24, 29; though cf. 2.7.5b, p. 12.2–12; cf. Diog. Laert. 2.93; Marc. Aur. 9.1.2. Others besides Stoics associated ignorance with evil, e.g., Porph. Marc. 13.225.

15. Diaspora Jews could associate impiety with idolatry (e.g., Sib. Or. 3.36; cf. connection with homosexual acts in Sib. Or. 3.184–86 and with judgment in 3.568).

16. Note the interpretations (in Bray, Romans, 34–35) of Origen Comm. Rom. on 1:18 (CER 1:134, 140); Ambrosiaster Comm. (CSEL 81:39); Apollinaris of Laodicea, catena on Rom. 1:18 (PGK 15:59). For idolatry as turning from truth, see, e.g., T. Mos. 5:2–4 (Israel); cf. even the later Neoplatonist concern with some images distorting divine truth (Iambl. Letter 18.1–3, in Stob. Anth. 3.11.35).

17. See, e.g., Epict. Diat. 2.19.26 (though contrast 2.8.14); Max. Tyre Or. 9.2; Porph. Marc. 18.302–4; more moderately, Iambl. Myst. 1.13.

18. See, e.g., Val. Max. 1.1.16–21; 1.1.ext.1–1.1.ext.9; Philost. Hrk. 53.17; especially in the ancient Near East, see Kratz and Spieckermann, Wrath.

19. E.g., 1 Esd. 8:21; 1 Macc. 3:8; Jdt. 9:9; Bar. 2:13, 20; Jub. 15:34; CD 8.3; Sib. Or. 1.179.

20. E.g., Sib. Or. 3.763, 766; 5.75–76 (in view of 5.77–85); Sipre Deut. 96.2.1.

21. See, e.g., Reicke, “Natürliche Theologie”; Stagg, “Plight.” This need not mean (pace Cranfield, “Romans 1.18,” 335) that the wrath of Rom. 1:18 is also revealed in the gospel. Technically, 1:18 says only that “wrath” is revealed, but a contextual contrast with God’s righteousness as salvation (1:16–17) is rendered more likely because Paul contrasts wrath and salvation elsewhere (Rom. 5:9; 1 Thess. 5.9; cf. Rom. 9:22–24).

22. Contrast Rom. 1:25; 2:8. For Paul, Jewish people, conversely, have some truth in the law (Rom. 2:20), though not the fullness available in Christ; cf. Eph. 1:13; 2 Thess. 2:12–13. Here Paul would envision faith not as a “leap in the dark” (to borrow Kierkegaard’s oft-cited
Excursus: Knowledge of God in Ancient Mediterranean Thought

Greek thought highly valued the knowledge of deity. Although this interest was not limited to philosophers, it particularly predominates there. For example, a Cynic writer believes that the true knowledge of God includes right understanding of God’s character, as revealed by creation rather than mortals’ rituals. The Stoic Seneca contends that knowing what God is like would deliver mortals from superstition. A later Neoplatonist emphasizes correct understanding about God that leads to correctly approaching him and to one’s mind being conformed to his character. To a Pythagorean writer, knowledge of God leads to quietness, which perhaps reflects the understanding of one’s proper station that correct self-knowledge was thought to produce. Yet most philosophers held that knowledge of God was quite rare. Many writers echoed Plato’s view concerning knowledge of God: “To discover the Maker and Father of this universe is a task, and after discovering him it is impossible to tell of him” to others.

but perhaps differently intended phrase, presupposing a Kantian dichotomy of subjective faith and objective reason) but as a deliberate response to the convincing and persuasive light of truth. He never would have associated it with our popular conception of “make-believe,” in which one tries to convince oneself and so, by strong wishing, to exercise power over internal or (magically) external reality.

23. I condense the following discussion from Keener, John, 237–38, 240–43. Translators typically use “God” for the universal or ultimate deity in these passages, without implying any assimilation to the Judean God.

24. For one mystery cult’s interest in the knowledge of God, as interpreted by an educated Greek for an intellectual audience, see Plut. Isis 2, Mor. 352A. For revelatory knowledge of the divine in the mysteries, cf. also Goodenough, Church, 7. Reitzenstein (Mystery-Religions, 364–425) emphasizes the mysteries but relies much too heavily on later sources, many of which may betray Christian influence. Paul’s desire to transmit λόγος and acquire “knowledge” places him closer to philosophical schools than to the mysteries (cf. also Malherbe, Social Aspects, 47–48, on Edwin Judge’s approach).


26. Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 95.48. For Seneca, to know God (deum nosse) meant to know the mind of the universe (Nat. Q. 1.pref.13). For Musonius Rufus, cutting off the dead part of the soul enabled one to know God (Mus. Ruf. 53, p. 144.24–25).


30. Plato Tim. 28C, as quoted and interpreted in Nock, “Gnosticism,” 267; see also Dodd, “Prologue,” 16.
The Alexandrian Jewish philosopher Philo insists on proper knowledge about God;\(^31\) he even replaces manna with heavenly knowledge\(^32\) and indicates that the Logos dwells in knowledge.\(^33\) Those with true knowledge of God are aptly entitled God’s children.\(^34\) Nature attests God’s reality, but God himself remains essentially unknowable by natural means.\(^35\) Wisdom also leads to the knowledge of God,\(^36\) but even philosophic reflection on what is proper does not necessarily lead beyond human thoughts; the mind must value God above all else, do everything it does on account of God, and ascend into knowledge of God.\(^37\) Philo combines revelation with intuition;\(^38\) as important as reason is, the highest mysteries are available only through direct experience with God.\(^39\)

Judean sources also valued divine knowledge. In Scripture, knowing God often has an ethical component (e.g., Jer. 22:16).\(^40\) “Knowledge of God” in the Hebrew Bible usually indicates a right relationship with him, one predicated on proper knowledge about him and expressed in genuine piety.\(^41\) Knowing God also can express intimacy with God\(^42\) and can indicate the covenant relationship (cf. Hosea 2:20).\(^43\) In Scripture God often acts in a self-revealing way so that people “might know that I am YHWH.”\(^44\)

The Dead Sea Scrolls heavily emphasize knowledge of God.\(^45\) Thus, the author of one Qumran document extols God as the source of knowledge who enlightens the writer to understand God’s mysteries.\(^46\) For the Qumran

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31. Philo Mos. 1.212; Drunkenness 43, 45; cf. Posterity 12; Dreams 1.231.
33. Philo Flight 76.
34. Philo Conf. 145.
35. For a discussion of Philo’s view of divine ineffability, see Wolfson, Philo, 2.94–164, esp. 110–138; Mondin, “Esistenza.”
36. Philo Unchangeable 143.
37. Philo Alleg. Interp. 3.126.
38. Wolfson, Philo, 1:36, citing Philo Sacr. 78, 79. Wolfson thinks Philonic knowledge is essentially intellectual, although it includes philosophical frenzy (Philo, 2:3–10). Dodd emphasizes the mystical element (Interpretation, 62).
40. This dimension continued in early Judaism; cf. Shapiro, “Wisdom.” Cf. moral dimensions of knowledge, sometimes connected with justice, in the Dead Sea Scrolls (1QM 13.3; Wilcox, “Dualism,” 89, cites 1QS 3.1; 1QH 19.8 [Sukenik 11.8]; cf. 1QS 8.9; 9.17).
41. Dentan, Knowledge, 35.
42. Cf. the sense of knowing in Gen. 4:1; Pss. 1:6; 55:13; 88:18; Dentan, Knowledge, 37–38.
44. E.g., Exod. 6:7; 7:5, 17; 10:2; 14:4; 18; 16:12; 1 Kings 20:13; 20:28; and more than fifty times in Ezekiel.
45. See, e.g., Fritsch, Community, 73–74; Allegro, Scrolls, 132–33; Price, “Light from Qumran,” 26; Flusser, Judaism, 57–59; Lohse, Colossians, 25.
46. 1QS 10.12; 11.3.
sect, knowledge was a gift from the Spirit.\textsuperscript{47} Knowledge was salvific, and its focus was on understanding the Torah, which God had given to the Teacher of Righteousness and those who followed him.\textsuperscript{48} In the Scrolls,\textsuperscript{49} as in the Old Testament,\textsuperscript{50} knowledge will be complete in the eschatological time.

For pre-Christian sages, knowledge of God included the recognition that he alone is the true God.\textsuperscript{51} The wicked were those who did not know him\textsuperscript{52} or his law,\textsuperscript{53} and might mock the righteous for claiming to have the knowledge of God.\textsuperscript{54} In the late second century Rabbi Meir interpreted “know the Lord” in Hosea 2:22 (2:20 ET) as referring to those sharing the qualities listed in Hosea 2:21–22 (2:19–20 ET) knowing God’s will.\textsuperscript{55} The rabbis, who emphasized knowledge specifically of the law,\textsuperscript{56} taught that one would know God through learning\textsuperscript{57} and obeying\textsuperscript{58} his law; some rabbis believed that one would come to know God truly even through studying haggadah.\textsuperscript{59} In Jewish thought only Israel possessed the law, and therefore only Israel knew God.\textsuperscript{60}

Because many Gentile thinkers highly valued the knowledge of God, they would have agreed that suppressing the truth about God is a serious act of impiety. Some ancient thinkers insisted that nature gave human minds a longing for truth;\textsuperscript{61} thus, knowingly suppressing it by denying the existence of the gods is not merely ignorance but evil.\textsuperscript{62} For some, as for Paul here, belief in a deity could be a basic element of reason, “one of those norms of which

\ \textsuperscript{47} Lohse, \textit{Colossians}, 25–26, citing 1QS 4.4; 1QSb 5.25; 1QH\textsuperscript{+} 20.11–12; 6.25 (Sukenik 12.11–12; 14.25). Painter, “Gnosticism,” 2, cites 1QS 3.6–7; 4.6.
\textsuperscript{48} Garnet, “Light,” 20, citing 1QH\textsuperscript{1} 4.5–6, 23–24, 27–28; 5.20–39; 8.4–26; 9.29–36.
\textsuperscript{49} 1QS 4.22; 1QM 11.15; 1Q27 1.7.
\textsuperscript{50} E.g., Isa. 11:9; 52:6; Jer. 24:7; 31:34 (toned down in \textit{Tg. Jer.} on 31:34); Ezek. 34:30; 36:23–28; 37:6, 12–14, 27–28; Hosea 2:19–20; Joel 3:17; Hab. 2:14; cf. 1 Cor. 13:8–12.
\textsuperscript{51} Sir. 36:5 (alternative location 33:5).
\textsuperscript{52} Wis. 2:22; 12:27; 13:1; 14:22; 16:16; Sir. 36:5.
\textsuperscript{53} 2 Bar. 48:40.
\textsuperscript{54} Wis. 2:13.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Abot R. Nat.} 37 A.
\textsuperscript{56} E.g., \textit{b. Ber.} 33a; \textit{Sanh.} 92a; earlier, Bar. 3:36; 4:1. See also Wewers, “Wissen,” 143–48; Bultmann, “\textit{Γινώσκω},” 701.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Sipre Deut.} 41.3.2.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Sipre Deut.} 33.1.1.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Sipre Deut.} 49.2.2.
\textsuperscript{60} E.g., 4 Ezra 3:32; 2 Bar. 14:5; 48:40.
\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Cic. Tusc.} 1.19.44.
\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Cic. Nat. d.} 2.16.44 (reporting the Stoic view).
reason consists." Some Gentiles believed that the earliest people had true knowledge that became enshrined in religion. Many Gentiles also believed that humanity had declined morally from the earlier era.

One basic conviction about deity that was widely shared was that the existence of deity was self-evident. As in Paul’s perspective, exemplified in Romans 1, most ancient thinkers believed that they recognized divine design in nature. Epicureans, who denied divine design in nature, were deemed idiosyncratic. Socrates, for example, thought that nature revealed divine benevolence and thus invited praise. Stoics also inferred God’s existence from order in nature. They could thus claim that Zeus was manifest in his works in creation. The Jewish philosopher Philo also believed that creation provided understanding about its designer. Some other Jews conversant with Greek thought affirmed that Moses declared that God was revealed by his works.

63. Stowers, “Self-Mastery,” 543. Though some atheists existed (see Winiarczyk, “Altertum”), they were a clear minority (Sext. Emp. Pyr. 3.218). Sextus Empiricus suspended judgment about the existence of the gods (Pyr. 3.218–38). For a survey including ancient rationalism and atheism, see Meijer, “Philosophers.” For their arguments, see Ps.-Plut. Plac. 1.7.1–10, especially in Runia, “Atheists.” On Prodicus’s atheism, see Henrichs, “Notes” (though even Prodicus did not reject all deities, only the Olympians; Henrichs, “Atheism”).

64. See Van Nuffelen, “Divine Antiquities.”

65. See Max. Tyre Or. 36.1–2 (in Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 73); Stowers, Rereading, 85, 98–99, 122 (citing, e.g., Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 90; Anacharsis Ep. 9). For the decline from the primeval golden age, see, e.g., Hesiod W.D. 110–201 (though not all were inferior to their predecessors); Ovid Metam. 1.89–312 (with further impiety growing from the first impieties; Metam. 15.111–13); Babr. prologue 1–4. Moral decline also recapitulated itself in the Roman state (Sall. Catil. 6.13–3.5).

66. Cic. Nat. d. 2.32.81–82; 2.54.133–58.146 (though this Stoic argument also identifies God with the cosmos; cf. Gelinus, “Argument”); Dio Chrys. Or. 12.33–34; Plut. Isis 76, Mor. 382A. Though some readers today know of divine design as a traditional argument in monotheistic religions (sometimes deployed for or against evolution), it was actually common among polytheistic thinkers in antiquity.


68. Xen. Mem. 4.3.12–13. For divine benevolence, see also Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 95.50; Epict. Diatr. 2.14.11.


Later rabbis even developed the tradition that Abraham reasoned back to a first cause.73

Ancient thinkers would also understand Paul’s language about some knowledge of God being obvious within humans (Rom. 1:19).74 Many regarded knowledge about God as innate within people.75 Early humans could not remain ignorant, some thinkers opined, because Zeus had given them “intelligence and the capacity for reason,” and nature’s splendors testified about him.76 That all peoples had some conception of deities, they reasoned, showed that this truth was innate or implanted in everyone.77 Similarly, divine design is evident within the human body78 and especially in human reason.79

Some thinkers connected human reason with the divine Reason that designed the universe.80 Like many other Middle Platonists,81 Philo believed that God used the world of intellect as a pattern for the material world.82 He argues that God formed the universe through his logos, or reason.83 In Philo logos is not only divine Reason structuring matter but, as in some other Middle Platonic thought, a pattern that is God’s image.84 Philo connects the creative logos with the wisdom of Reason by which God draws the ideal wise

73. Davies, Paul, 28–29; cf. comment below (p. 15).
74. Paul could mean that it was simply obvious to them (cf. Jer. 40:6 LXX [33:6 ET]; perhaps Gal. 1:16), but analogous language in Rom. 8:17–19 probably suggests that Paul refers to something within them (cf. Rom. 1:24; 2:15; 11:17; 2 Cor. 6:16). Among ancient commentators, see (in Bray, Romans, 38) Chrys. Hom. Rom. 3; Ps.-Const. Rom. (ENPK 24); Pelagius Comm. Rom. on 1:19.
77. Cic. Tus. 1.13.30; Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 117.6; cf. Max. Tyre Or. 11.5; Artem. Oneir. 1.8.
81. Plato thought that God had built the universe according to the ideal pattern shaped by reason (Plato Tim. 29A–30), and some Middle Platonists came to take this literally, attributing matter’s origin to Soul (Plut. Epitome of Gen. of Soul 2, Mor. 1030E; Table 8.2.4, Mor. 720AB; later, cf. Plot. Enn. 3.2).
82. Philo Creation 16; Conf. 171.
83. Philo Creation 20, 26, 31; Migr. 6. I borrow and condense material here from Keener, John, 376–79.
84. Philo Creation 17–19, 25, 31. For the Logos as God’s image, see also Philo Conf. 97; Flight 101; Wisdom as God’s image, Alleg. Interp. 1.43. Thus, God made the world as a copy of his divine image, the logos being his archetypal seal impressed on them (Philo Creation 16, 26, 36). For God using a pattern in creation, cf. also Jub. 2.2; 1QS 11.11; m. Sanh. 4:5; Gen. Rab. 1:1.
person to himself.85 The human mind is allied to this divine Reason, or logos, because it is a copy of it.86

Some early Christian thinkers also developed this conventional notion that truth about God could be inferred from creation,87 although they differed as to the extent to which this potential proved effective.88 Contrary to what is argued by some of Paul’s interpreters, Paul apparently does believe that people can infer some truth about God from nature, although in a limited way.89 What this belief means is debated; some distinguish between natural theology and general revelation, or between knowledge about God that humans can infer from nature on their own and God revealing himself to them in nature.90 In any case, Paul is not trying to demonstrate God’s existence but is insisting that Gentiles already know of him.91 The revelation was sufficient to bring just condemnation, but not salvation, which is revealed only in the good news about Jesus (Rom. 1:16–17).92

**Corrupted Minds Resist Rational Evidence from Creation**

Paul complains that God had revealed rationally perceptible truth in creation, but people created alternative and inferior frameworks of thought

85. Philo Sacr. 8; each individual’s mind fits the image of the universal mind in Creation 69. Cf. logos as the shared element of human reason and the reason that structured the cosmos in Thorsteinsson, “Stoicism,” 23; Long, Philosophy, 108. For Stoics, the human mind was an example of universal reason (Cic. Nat d. 2.6.18–2.8.20; cf. 2.8.21–2.13.32; cf. also Murray, Stages, 167, citing Chrysippus frg. 913 [SVF]). The connection goes back to Heraclitus (see Long, Philosophy, 131, 145), who identified thought (γνώμη) as what guides the cosmos (Diog. Laert. 9.1.1). (Some have doubted Heraclitus’s logos doctrine [Glasson, “Doctrine”], but the evidence, while scant [Glasson, “Doctrine,” 232], remains [Lee, Thought, 79; Miller, “Logos,” 174–75].) Zeno reportedly identified the all-pervasive logos with both the universal law of nature and Zeus (Diog. Laert. 7.1.88). For Stoics, reason (λόγος) was the active principle that acted on matter (Diog. Laert. 7.1.134); Anaxagoras described mind (νοῦς, Diog. Laert. 2.8) in this way. Later Platonism also absorbed many of these concepts (Dillon, Middle Platonists, 80, 83).

86. Philo Creation 146.

87. E.g., Theoph. 1.5–6; and (in Bray, Romans, 37–38) Origen Comm. Rom. on 1:19 (CER 1:136–42), and on 1:20 (esp. regarding philosophers; CER 1:142); Ambrosiaster Comm. (CSEL 81:39, 41); Apollinaris of Laodicea, catena on Rom. 1:19 (PGK 15:59).

88. Most believed that it secured humanity’s just condemnation (Bray, Romans, 34; Reasoner, Full Circle, 12); only rarely did it lead some to divine knowledge (Reasoner, Full Circle, 12–13). But cf. Theodoret Comm. 1 Cor. 171 (in Bray, Corinthians, 14–15).

89. See observations in Moo, Romans, 123.


92. Cf. Oden, “Excuse”; Young, “Knowledge”; Cobb and Lull, Romans, 41; Calvin in Reasoner, Full Circle, 16–17.

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to evade God’s truth. Because they refused the truth they had, they became incapable of discerning truth. In Romans 1:20–21 Paul argues that God’s revelation, including his “invisible characteristics” (ἀόρατα), is “seen” (καθορᾶται, 1:20) and that the resistant heart has been “darkened” (ἐσκοτίσθη, 1:21), playing on the widespread ancient use of vision as an analogy for knowing. Many thinkers emphasized the vision of the mind, often of the divine, especially in the Platonic tradition. This emphasis is frequent in Philo, a Jewish eclectic Middle Platonist thinker; for example, he condemns blindness of soul and emphasizes that, given the transcendence of God, divine inspiration in the soul is the best way to envision him.

Humanity refused to act on true knowledge about the creator by honoring him or being grateful (Rom. 1:21). Paul probably viewed this expression of resisting true knowledge as not merely negligent but also defiant. Ingratitude was considered an abominable offense; Seneca deemed it a more fundamental vice than adultery, murder, or tyranny, allowing that these other vices might spring from it. Ingratitude toward deities, however, was easily recognizable as the worst expression of ingratitude. Failure to act in accordance with truth about God ultimately deprived mortals of truth.

Paul emphasizes the corruption of Gentile minds in Romans 1:21–22 and 28, often echoing biblical phraseology. Thus in 1:21, for example, “they became

93. E.g., Max. Tyre Or. 6.1. See the discussion later in the book (pp. 207–9; probably 2 Cor. 3:17); much more fully, Keener, John, 247–50; and esp. Keener, Acts, 4:3524–26.

94. E.g., Cic. Tusc. 1.19.44; Marc. Aur. 11.1.1 (cf. 10.26).

95. E.g., Plato Phaedo 65E; 66A; 83A; Max. Tyre Or. 9.6; 10.3; 11.9, 11; 38.3; Iambl. Pyth. Life 6.31; 16.70; 32.228; Plot. Enn. 1.6.9; Porph. Marc. 16.274; cf. Kirk, Vision, 16–18.

96. Cf. Philo Eliph. 19; Spec. Laws 1.37; 3.4; 6; Unchangeable 181; Sacr. 36, 69, 78; Posterior 8, 118; Worse 22; Plant. 22; Drunkenness 44; Sober 3; Conf. 92; Migg. 39, 48, 165, 191; Heir 89; Prelim. St. 135; Names 3, 203; Abr. 58, 70; Dreams 1.117; 2.160; Mos. 1.185, 289; Rewards 37.


98. Cf., e.g., Philo Abr. 80; Spec. Laws 1.37; for limitations, cf., e.g., Rewards 36, 39–40.

99. Philo Sacr. 78; Conf. 92; Names 3–6; QG 4.138. For “Israel” as “the one who sees God,” see Conf. 92, 146; Dreams 1.171; Abr. 57.

100. See, e.g., Xen. Mem. 2.2.2–3; Cyr. 1.2.6–7; Rhet. Alex. 36, 1442a.13–14; Polyb. 6.6.6; Val. Max. 2.6.6; 2.6.7a; 5.3; Vell. Paterc. 2.57.1; 2.62.5; 2.69.1; Sen. Y. Ep. Lucifer 81.1, 28; Pliny Ep. 8.18.3; Suet. Claud. 25.1; Artus Did. 2.7.11k, pp. 80–81.21–25; Lucian Fisherman 5; Tim. 35; Jos. Ant. 19.361; 2 Tim. 3:2; see, further, the commentary in Keener, Acts, 3:3314–15.

101. Sen. Y. Ben. 1.10.4. Likewise, Cicero charged that ingratitude “includes all sins” (Cic. Att. 8.4 [trans. Winstedt, LCL, 2:117]). For Roman gratitude in terms of repaying benefaction, see Harrison, Grace, 40–43.


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worthless” (ἐματαιώθησαν, from ματαιόω) in their “reasonings” (διαλογισμοῖς) echoes the language of Psalm 93:11 (LXX; 94:11 ET), where merely human reasonings are worthless (διαλογισμοῖς . . . μάταιοι). Paul may choose this wording for another reason, since “worthless” was also a common Jewish designation for, or was often associated with, idols.

That sinners’ hearts, lacking understanding, were darkened probably also echoes biblical language and would have been widely intelligible. Ignorance could be viewed as darkness, the realm that impaired vision. Similarly, Stoics viewed the ignorant masses as “blind,” and many depicted ignorance as blindness, particularly in moral or divine matters. Gentile thinkers recognized that vices blinded people. Jewish authors agreed that sin blinded people; they also recognized that, as here, God could punish deliberate ignorance with further spiritual blindness.

In the very process of boasting of their self-made wisdom, mortals became more foolish (Rom. 1:22). That professed wisdom could be folly was recognized by all who criticized some other, often rival, philosophic schools. That a Jewish writer would view idolatrous Gentiles as ignorant is even less surprising.

103. With Byrne, Romans, 74. Paul cites the verse more explicitly in 1 Cor. 3:20.
104. E.g., Let. Aris. 136, 139; Wis. 15:8; Sib. Or. 3.29, 547–48, 555; Acts 14:15; probably Wis. 13:1; Lev. 17:7; Jer. 2:5. The LXX sometimes translates “idols” with such language (e.g., 1 Kings 16:13, 26; 2 Kings 17:15; 2 Chron. 11:15; Pss. 30:7 [31:6 ET]; 39:5 [40:4 ET]; Jon. 2:9 [2:8 ET]; Isa. 44:9; Jer. 8:19; 10:3, 14–15; 51:18; Ezek. 8:10). It is associated with pagan background in Eph. 4:17; 1 Pet. 1:18.
105. Lack of understanding in the heart may echo Ps. 75:5–6 LXX (76:4–5 ET; Jewett, Romans, 158). Jewish sources often used darkness and light figuratively for evil and good, respectively (e.g., 1QS 3.3; 1Q27 1.5–6; 4Q183 2.4–8; T. Job 43:6/4; Sib. Or. frg. 1.26–27), or with reference to enlightenment in wisdom (Sir. 34:17 [32:20 ET]); this dualism is especially prominent in the DSS (e.g., 1QS 3.19–22; 1QM 13.5–6, 14–15; cf. Charlesworth, “Comparison”).
106. Darkness is portrayed as ignorance in Max. Tyre Or. 10.6; 29.5. In Val. Max. 7.2.ext.1a, Socrates opines that mortal minds, unlike those of the gods, can be in darkness. Idolatry darkens minds in T. Sol. 26.7.
107. Sen. Y. Ep. Lucil. 50.3; Epict. Diatr. 1.18.4, 6; 2.20.37; 2.24.19; Marc. Aur. 4.29.
108. E.g., Lucian Phil. Sale 27; Iamb. Pyth. Life 6.31. The image extended beyond philosophic use (e.g., Catullus 64.207–9; Aeschylus Prom. 447–48; Val. Max. 7.3.6; Dio Chrys. Or. 32.26).
111. See, e.g., Isa. 42:18–20; Jer. 5:21; Ezek. 12:2; Wis. 2:21; Jos. War 5.343; T. Jos. 7:5; cf. 1 En. 89:33, 41, 54; 90:7; 93:8; 99:8.
113. Cf., e.g., Lucian Phil. Sale 27.
114. See, e.g., Jub. 6:35; 22:18; t. Shab. 8:5; Eph. 4:17–18.