To Gilles Emery, OP,  
and Bruce Marshall
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This book originated in thinking about two interrelated issues: first, the work of the Holy Spirit in guiding the church, an issue that came to the fore in my research on Mary’s Assumption and on the church’s mediation of divine revelation; and second, the holiness of the church, an issue that particularly took shape for me through Ephraim Radner’s extraordinary book on the topic. It also originated in a powerful experience of the Holy Spirit during a moment of decision in the spring of 2010. I long for an intimate relationship with Jesus Christ through the Holy Spirit, both because I want to live a life of charity now and because I want to be prepared for passing from this life rather than dying in isolation and fear. I would like to know God intimately now, and not just be a student of a God whose presence I ward off.

In preparing this book, I was blessed to participate in two superb ecumenical conferences. Part of chapter 7, in an earlier version, was delivered at the invitation of Tal Howard and Mark Noll, at their conference “Protestantism? Reflections in Advance of the 500th Anniversary of the Protestant Reformation, 1517–2017,” sponsored by the Center for Faith and Inquiry at Gordon College; my paper will appear in a forthcoming volume edited by Tal and Mark for Oxford University Press. An attendee at the conference, Ferde Rombola, saved me from a significant error in my paper. Part of chapter 3, in an earlier version, was delivered at Wheaton College’s conference “The Spirit of God: Christian Renewal in the Community of Faith,” at the invitation of Jeffrey Barbeau and Beth Felker Jones: see my “Rationalism or Revelation? St. Thomas Aquinas and the Filioque,” in Spirit of God: Christian Renewal in the Community of Faith, ed. Jeffrey W. Barbeau and Beth Felker Jones (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2015), 59–73. The palpable Christian faith at both Gordon and Wheaton was deeply inspiring. An earlier version of
chapter 1 was published at the invitation of Daniel Castelo in a special issue of the International Journal of Systematic Theology (16 [2014]: 126–42) under the title “The Holy Spirit in the Trinitarian Communion: ‘Love’ and ‘Gift’?”

This book would not have been written without the support of Dave Nelson, my editor at Baker Academic. Dave is both a master editor and a significant theological scholar in his own right. Similarly, I could not have written the book without Jim and Molly Perry, who, at the invitation of the now-Bishop Robert Barron, endowed the chair at Mundelein Seminary that I gratefully hold. My academic dean, Fr. Thomas Baima, made possible the appointment of David Augustine, a brilliant young theologian, as my research assistant. David helped me with obtaining books and articles, and he put together the bibliography and indexes. Even more important has been the wonderful friendship that he has given me. After I had drafted the book, I received superb corrections and criticisms on the whole manuscript from Alexander Pierce, who is currently completing a master’s degree at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School. Comments on chapters 1–5 were given with typical grace, charm, and depth by Fr. Robert Imbelli, who first taught me the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in a doctoral course on that topic at Boston College. I owe him double thanks! Other expert theologians generously read the manuscript, in whole or in part, and made crucial corrections: Gilles Emery, OP, Bruce Marshall, Daniel Keating, Ken Loyer, and Dominic Langevin, OP. I am deeply grateful for their friendship and help. Let me also thank Brian Bolger and the editorial team at Baker Academic, who did an excellent job on the production of this book. I should note that throughout this book I employ the Revised Standard Version, Catholic Edition (Camden, NJ: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1966; reprinted by Ignatius Press), unless noted otherwise.

To my beautiful wife, Joy: what a gift you are to me and to our beloved children, extended family, and friends. You exemplify the truth that “the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control” (Gal. 5:22–23). May God the Father unite you ever closer to the love of Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit, and may the work of your hands be blessed.

In the labor of theology, the study of what God has revealed for our salvation, we need masters who know well that we “have one master, the Christ” (Matt. 23:10). St. Thomas Aquinas is a master in Christ, and his insights have come to me through friends who are also master teachers. It is to two such learned and devout friends, Gilles Emery and Bruce Marshall, that I dedicate this book.
Introduction

Graham Tomlin has remarked that “today we need not just a theology of the Holy Spirit, but theology done in the Holy Spirit. Theology in the Spirit has to be theology done close to the community of the Spirit, the temple of God, the body of Christ in which the Spirit chooses to make Christ known.”1 This requires not only theology done by a Christian who shares in the life and worship of the church but also theology done with the great “cloud of witnesses” (Heb. 12:1) and with “all the saints” (1 Cor. 13:13), especially those whose teachings on the Holy Spirit, guided by the scriptural word, have informed the ways in which the church praises the Spirit.2 Yet, Christians have disagreed and continue to disagree about the Holy Spirit’s person and work. How then should a trinitarian theology of and in the Holy Spirit, whose aim is to contribute to understanding the Spirit found in “the body of Christ in which the Spirit chooses to make Christ known,” proceed?3

3. A theology of the Holy Spirit requires the full dimensions of trinitarian theology: as Kenneth Loyer states, “the proper basis of pneumatology is the doctrine of the Trinity” (Loyer, God’s Love through the Spirit: The Holy Spirit in Thomas Aquinas and John Wesley [Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2014], 70). The present book is focused upon the person and work of the Spirit. For further Thomistic exploration of the doctrine of the Trinity, with respect to themes that are not the focus of this book, see my Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); Gilles Emery, OP, La Trinité créatrice: Trinité et Création dans les commentaires aux Sentences de Thomas d’Aquin et de ses précurseurs Albert le Grand et Bonaventure (Paris: Vrin, 1995); Hans Christian Schmidbaur,
I argue in this book that the Holy Spirit should be praised and contemplated under the proper names “Love” and “Gift,” with respect both to his intra-trinitarian identity and to his historical work in Jesus Christ and the church. These names of the Spirit, of course, find their first exponent in Augustine, influenced especially by Hilary of Poitiers. The names “Love” and “Gift” have for centuries been a linchpin of Western pneumatology, Catholic and Protestant, and they have also found their way, to a certain degree, into Greek Orthodox pneumatology. Thus the contemporary Orthodox theologian Boris Bobrinskoy describes the Holy Spirit as “the mutual love and the bond of love between the Father and the Son” and “the common gift of the Father and the Son,” although Bobrinskoy distinguishes his position from that of Augustine by emphasizing that each person “gathers together and unites the others in himself” and that the Spirit gives himself (and gives the other persons) to us.
Today, however, many biblical scholars and theologians in the West have concerns about naming the Holy Spirit as “Love” and “Gift,” concerns that go beyond the intrinsic mystery of trinitarian naming. For example, biblical scholars often deny that the “Spirit” was a distinct divine subject for the first Christians. Going further, Paula Fredriksen underscores “the turbulence of Christianity’s first four centuries” and argues that Christian doctrine in the fourth century is related only by the barest threads to the biblical testimony. Theologians, while generally affirming the Spirit’s divinity, often assume that names of the Spirit can be only metaphorical, rather than proper names. Thus Jürgen Moltmann holds that Christian experience of the Spirit makes it possible to name the Spirit metaphorically—he proposes the metaphors “lord,” “mother,” “judge,” “energy,” “space,” “Gestalt,” “tempest,” “fire,” “love,” “light,” “water,” and “fertility”—but he does not think that the Spirit can be given a proper name (other than “Holy Spirit”) in the way required by the specificity of “Love” and “Gift.” This is so even though Moltmann ends up at a definition of the Spirit’s personhood that fits with the traditional emphasis

6. Larry W. Hurtado, although not opposed to later trinitarian developments, argues that the first Christians were “binitarian” in their devotional practice: see Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus Christ in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 651. Along similar lines—while disagreeing with Hurtado’s view that the first Christians worshiped Jesus—James D. G. Dunn points out that “the Spirit was from the beginning a way of speaking of God’s life-giving action in creating humankind (Gen. 2.7), of God’s presence throughout the cosmos (Ps. 139.7). So the Spirit of God was, like Wisdom and Word, a way of speaking of the divine immanence” (Dunn, Did the First Christians Worship Jesus? The New Testament Evidence [Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2010], 125–26).


8. Jürgen Moltmann, The Spirit of Life: A Universal Affirmation, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 269–85. Moltmann explains the limits and value of his metaphorical approach to the Spirit’s personhood, whose reality he grounds in Christian experience: This is only a deductive knowing, derived from the operation experienced, not a direct knowing face to face. But neither is it a speculative intrusion into the depths of the triune Deity in an attempt to understand the primordial relationships of the Spirit who proceeds from the Father and radiates from the Son. In the primordial trinitarian relationships, the Spirit must appear simply as he is. There, it is of course true that only the Father knows the Spirit whom he breathes out, and only the Son knows the Spirit whom he receives. But in the efficacies experienced and in the energies perceived, this primal personhood of the Spirit is concealed from us, and we paraphrase the mystery of his life with many metaphors. And yet the operation of the Spirit is different from the acts in creation which we ascribe to the Father, and different from the reconciling sufferings which we ascribe to the Son; and from this difference in kind of his efficacy and his energies, the unique character of his personhood is revealed. (ibid., 285)
on love and gift: “The personhood of God the Holy Spirit is the loving, self-communicating, out-fanning and out-pouring presence of the eternal divine life of the triune God.”

Ephraim Radner criticizes the names “Love” and “Gift” more directly. Convinced that to name the Spirit “Love” is generally “a bad idea,” he suggests that Augustine’s “conceptualization of the Spirit as ‘this’ or ‘that’—love, grace, copula, vinculum—establishes within the Western tradition a principle of pneumatic abstraction, capable in theory of being decoupled from Christian particularities.” This concern about “abstraction” appears in a different way in the work of Sinclair Ferguson. While conceding that in a “general sense” the Spirit is “the bond of love” between the Father and Son, Ferguson remarks approvingly that “contemporary Protestant Christianity tends to be impatient with subtle theological questions and distinctions such

In the first chapter of his book, Moltmann offers a lengthy defense of taking Christian experience as his starting point.

9. Ibid., 289.

as this [the filioque].”11 Instead, Ferguson approaches the Spirit biblically as the Paraclete, the Spirit of Christ, the Spirit of truth, the eschatological Spirit, the Spirit of new creation and renewal, the life-giving Spirit, the Spirit of order and unity, the Spirit as bestowing divine gifts (such as faith), and the Spirit of holiness, and the Spirit of intercession and communion. Ferguson finds these biblical depictions of the Spirit to suffice on their own. To give a final example, Steven Studebaker considers that “the result of relying on the processions of the divine persons as the source of their personal identities is to conceive of the Spirit in derivative and passive terms.”12 For Studebaker, to name the Holy Spirit “Love” and “Gift” is to consign the Spirit to the status of a passive, less-than-personal fruit of the activity of the Father and Son, so that the Spirit is fatally subordinated to the Father and Son.

By contrast, I argue in this book that, without compromising the divine incomprehensibility, the names “Love” and “Gift” instruct us about the distinct divine personality of the Spirit and shed light upon the biblical, liturgical, and experiential testimonies to the Spirit’s missions. In his 1986 encyclical on the Holy Spirit, Dominum et vivificantem, Pope John Paul II emphasizes that the Holy Spirit is “he who is the love of the Father and of the Son, he who is gift.”13

12. Steven M. Studebaker, From Pentecost to the Triune God: A Pentecostal Trinitarian Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 116. Studebaker bemoans the fact that “christological emphases still dominate Trinitarian theology,” and he argues that “the doctrine of the filioque overlooks the biblical data that portrays the Holy Spirit involved as much in constituting the Son as the Son is in sending the Spirit: e.g., conception, baptism, empowerment in temptation and ministry, and raising Christ from the dead” (ibid., 120). I take up this basic concern later in this introduction in relation to the work of Thomas Weinandy and Sarah Coakley. For Studebaker, as for others whose approaches we will examine, “the Spirit brings to completion the fellowship of the trinitarian God. The Father and the Son are not in communion until the Holy Spirit brings them into loving communion. That is, the identities of the Father and the Son described in John 17 are not realized in the immanent taxis ‘until’ the third stage of the taxis—the subsistence of the Holy Spirit” (ibid., 121). He explains, “The unavoidable temporal sound of this description—that is, ‘until’—reflects the limitation of human language and does not introduce a temporal sequence into the Godhead any more than does the traditional discussion of the immanent order of the processions of the divine persons” (ibid.). This position undermines the Father’s full begetting of the Son; the Father (or quasi-Father) would beget a quasi-Son, who would be completed and made “Son” by the Spirit. Studebaker embraces the implications of his position: “Rather than halting the formation of the identities of the divine persons at the moment of the double procession of the Holy Spirit, I want to expand the dynamic development of the divine persons’ identities beyond the processions. . . More specifically, the activity of the Holy Spirit in the immanent Godhead contributes to the personal identity of not only the Father and the Son, but also of the Holy Spirit” (ibid., 122). He thereby anthropomorphizes the divine persons.
Among contemporary theologians, Gilles Emery and Bruce Marshall have prominently defended these names. Drawing upon the biblical and liturgical portraits of the Holy Spirit, Emery states, “The Spirit is, in person, the ‘Gift of God Most High,’ as the church chants in the hymn *Veni Creator Spiritus*. The Holy Spirit is the Gift of the Father and of the Son in the same manner that he is the Love of the Father and of the Son. The first Gift of God is Love himself.”\(^{14}\) Similarly, Marshall has highlighted the way in which the Holy Spirit “is perfect gift from perfect giver” and possesses “love as a property marking his personal distinction from the Father and the Son.”\(^{15}\)

Should the Father and Son Also Be Named “Love” and “Gift”? Why, however, should not the other persons of the Trinity also be named Love and Gift? Certainly each of the persons must be fully love, because “God is love” (1 John 4:8).\(^{16}\) Since this is so, how can we reserve the names “Love” and “Gift” for the Holy Spirit? Indeed, writing from within what John Milbank calls “a voluntarist line of descent which seeks to comprehend the Trinity entirely in terms of the categories of ‘will,’ ‘love,’ and ‘freedom,’” Hans Urs von Balthasar has argued that kenotic love and gift define the core of each of the divine persons.\(^{17}\) Thus, regarding the Father’s “generation” of the Son,

\(^{14}\) Emery, *Trinity*, 156.

\(^{15}\) Marshall, “Deep Things of God,” 404. Graham Tomlin puts it in more popular terms: “There is no other way to know the love of the Father for the Son, the love that lies at the heart of God, the love that lies at the very centre of the universe, that alone can change and transform human hearts, affections and behaviour, than through the Holy Spirit” (Tomlin, *Prodigal Spirit*, 34).

\(^{16}\) R. W. L. Moberly urges theologians not to ignore the christological and epistemological context of 1 John 4. For Moberly, 1 John’s point is simply that “one can know that one knows God only if the loving reality of God in Jesus is appropriated and demonstrated”—or, in other words, “the way to know that one knows God is to display that love for the brethren which is not only embodied by Jesus but also mandated by Jesus as the form that the knowledge of God must take” (Moberly, “‘Test the Spirits’: God, Love, and Critical Discernment in 1 John 4,” in *The Holy Spirit and Christian Origins: Essays in Honor of James D. G. Dunn*, ed. Graham N. Stanton, Bruce W. Longenecker, and Stephen C. Barton [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004], 296–307, at 304–5). Moberly warns against the theological tendency to treat 1 John 4:8, “God is love,” as “a freestanding axiom” or “a theoretical definition of deity in terms of a supreme human quality” (ibid., 305). But in my view, Moberly is restricting the range of meanings too narrowly, as though stating that the God of Israel is “love” (in the sense of an infinite, analogous attribute) need be in competition with the revelation of this God in Jesus Christ or with the requirements of discipleship.

Balthasar prefers to speak of “the self-giving of the Father to the Son,” or of the Father’s self-dispossession “in favor of the Son,” or of the Son’s generation as an “expression” or “act of the Father’s love.”\(^1\) In begetting the Son, the Father shows himself to be Gift-Love. Although Balthasar identifies the Holy Spirit as “the ‘gift’ par excellence, the gift of the Father and of the Son and of their reciprocity,” in his view the Son too is best construed in terms of gift (and love).\(^2\) Along these lines, Balthasar remarks that the Son “represents the

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\(^1\) Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Logic, vol. 2, Truth of God*, trans. Adrian J. Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2004), 136–37, 167. Balthasar appeals to Bonaventure’s description of the Son as a “similitudo expressa,” as well as to Bonaventure’s refusal “to abstract from the love of the Father when considering the procession of the Son” (ibid., 164). For Balthasar, as for Bonaventure, the revelation that God is love requires that God be Trinity, since real love requires “transcendental plurality” (Balthasar, *Theo-Logic, vol. 3, The Spirit of Truth*, trans. Graham Harrison [San Francisco: Ignatius, 2005], 217). Indebted to Balthasar, Anne Hunt argues that it is especially the paschal mystery—the mystery of Christ’s cross, descent into hell, and resurrection—that displays this “inextricably interconnected” relationship of the missions of the Son and the Spirit (Hunt, “The Trinity through Paschal Eyes,” in *Rethinking Trinitarian Theology: Disputed Questions and Contemporary Issues in Trinitarian Theology*, ed. Giulio Maspero and Robert J. Woźniak [London: T&T Clark, 2012], 472–89, at 486). In her view, the paschal mystery shows the error of explicating the Father’s begetting of the Son “by way of intelligence. . . . Both processions, from the vantage point of the paschal mystery, are processions of love” (ibid., 488). I would add that surely both processions, from this vantage point, are also wisdom and truth. For the movement from the economy of salvation to the doctrine of the Trinity and back again, see especially Emery, *Trinity*.

\(^2\) As Michael Schulz comments (with an eye to Hegel’s personalist development of the notion of “substance”):

Starting with the idea of essential “being-love” Balthasar emphasizes that the productive recognition of the Father is to be understood as love, wherein the selflessness of the recognition and its productivity stand as the centre point, and not the self-reference (*Selbstbezug*) of the Father, who would only find himself through the generation (*Zeugung*) as the knower (*Erkenner*). . . . Balthasar famously defines that loving, productive knowing of the Father as the *ur-kenosis*, as a radical self-emptying, which becomes apparent in the historical gift of self (*Dahingabe*) of the Son through the Father. The Son reveals his identity in his kenosis and self-giving; it is the answer to the Father. The essential recognition and loving is immanent to the Spirit. (Schulz, “The Trinitarian Concept of Essence and Substance,” in Maspero and Woźniak, *Rethinking Trinitarian Theology*, 146–76, at 165, 172)

Criticalizing scholastic trinitarian theology, Balthasar states,

If we look from the Scriptures to Scholasticism, we can only wonder at the complete change of intellectual atmosphere. The general Scholastic procedure is to lay down an initial thesis about the impenetrability of the trinitarian mystery but then, in spite of that, to attempt to get to the bottom of the relationships between the unity of the divine essence and the trinity of the hypostases using ever more hairsplitting distinctions. . . .
entire trinitarian love in the form of expression,” namely the expression of the Father’s self-dispossession or absolute kenosis. From this perspective, “Gift” and “Love” can hardly be proper names of the Holy Spirit, since both Father and Son are also best understood as sheer Gift-Love. Or even if they are proper names of the Holy Spirit, they are such insofar as they indicate that the Gift-Love characteristic of the Father and Son finds its “epitome and fruit” in the Spirit.

For his part, Thomas Aquinas gladly affirms that in the economy of salvation at least, “the Son is given . . . from the Father’s love.” The Trinity is

Also astonishing is the fascination exercised by the Augustinian analogue drawn from the human mind, which attains to an explicit self-consciousness (memoria) only through projection of itself (intellectus) and through affirmation of its self-identity in its image (voluntas, amor). (Balthasar, Theo-Logic, vol. 2, Truth of God, 161)


“Ur-kenosis,” which refers to the trinitarian event in which the Father emptyes himself to give space to the Son, is understood as the ground of the radical kenosis of the incarnation and cross that is the subject of Philippians 2:5–11. Balthasar does not draw attention to Hegelian anticipations. Yet, given his knowledge of Hegel’s texts, it is unlikely that he is unaware of Hegel’s appeal to kenosis at the level of the Trinity either in the Phenomenology (#770), where the Word uttered by the Father represents his emptying, or in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (1821 MS, 83), in which Hegel speaks with somewhat of a greater distance from Christianity about the ‘self-emptying’ (Selbsttablassen) of the universal and abstract divine. Yet, whatever the degree of anticipation, Hegel fails to grasp that intra-divine kenosis is a relation that is as much constituted by the paternity and filiality as explaining them. (ibid., 229–30)


21. Balthasar, Theo-Logic, vol. 3, The Spirit of Truth, 218. López points out that for Balthasar, unlike Sergius Bulgakov, “there is no kenosis of the Holy Spirit” (López, Gift and the Unity of Being, 201n25). López explains, “If the Son is the reddition (reciprocation) of the gift, the Holy Spirit is the confirmation of the Father’s gift. The third person thus discloses the gratuitous nature of divine agape. Because the Holy Spirit is given by the Father, with and through the Son, as the overabundant confirmation of the gift that God is, no other person proceeds from him, nor does he need to ‘empty’ himself” (ibid., 213). It would seem, however, that “the gratuitous nature of divine agape” is also disclosed by the Father (and the Son).

22. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 38, a. 2, ad 1 (trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province [Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981]). Note also, in a similar vein,
indeed always a mystery of inexhaustible self-giving love, as revealed in Jesus Christ. But although each person is love, and although the incarnate Son’s self-giving love manifests the Father (John 14:9), Aquinas nonetheless holds that the names “Love” and “Gift” properly apply in the Trinity only to the Holy Spirit. Likewise, although each person is wise, and although the Spirit expresses the truth of the Father and Son in the economy (John 16:13), only the Son is properly “Word” in the Trinity. As I will discuss in more detail in the chapters that follow, I find Aquinas’s approach to biblically and analogously naming the Spirit to be persuasive. The Holy Spirit’s names Love and Gift, in conjunction with the Son’s name Word, well express the biblical witness to what the Orthodox theologian David Bentley Hart calls “the ‘intellect’ and ‘will’—the Logos and Spirit—of the Father.” When Jesus “returned in the power of the Spirit into Galilee” (Luke 4:14), this “power” (the Spirit) was distinctively Love and Gift.

The Plan of the Work

The present book begins with three chapters whose integration will be evident: a chapter on the exegetical path by which Augustine names the Holy Spirit “Love” and “Gift”; a chapter on whether these names are sufficiently cautious
in their analogical usage; and a chapter on whether the *filioque* implies rationalism. These three chapters focus largely on the Holy Spirit in the eternal trinitarian communion. The final four chapters address the Holy Spirit as Love and Gift in the economy of salvation. I examine the Holy Spirit’s missions to Jesus Christ and the church: specifically, the Spirit’s indwelling of Jesus and the manifestation of the Spirit at Jesus’s baptism and transfiguration (chap. 4), and the Spirit’s missions to and manifestations in the church (chap. 5). Chapters 4 and 5 do not explicitly address the names “Love” and “Gift,” but they do indicate the accordance of these names with what the Holy Spirit does for Christ and the church. I then take up two contested areas, among the many that could be addressed, with respect to the Spirit’s gifting to the people of God: the Spirit as the giver of a visible, institutional unity to the church through the bond of love (chap. 6); and the Spirit as the giver of true holiness to the church (chap. 7). In my four chapters on the Spirit’s work, I emphasize that if we accept the New Testament’s testimony to Jesus’s inauguration of the messianic kingdom of God, we need a correspondingly rich theology of the Spirit’s outpouring, both upon Jesus himself and upon the community of his

25. Drawing upon John Zizioulas, Reinhard Hütter makes a point that also serves to illumine my approach in this book: “The specific emphasis on pneumatology in Eastern Orthodox ecclesiology has christological roots. An emphatically pneumatological understanding of Christology avoids the false alternative between a christological and a pneumatological grounding of ecclesiology. This view develops God’s economy of salvation from a strictly trinitarian perspective; that is, it does not separate the salvific-economic mission of the Son from that of the Holy Spirit” (Hütter, *Suffering Divine Things: Theology as Church Practice*, trans. Doug Stott [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000], 118). Writing as a Lutheran, Hütter already has a high view of the church, a view that I share and seems to me to be necessitated by Jesus’s eschatological prophecies of the kingdom of God and by his outpouring of the eschatological Spirit. Hütter states, “In the Spirit ‘the church becomes an image (εἰκών) of the Trinity itself; it becomes ‘communion’ of the triune love. . . . As an eschatological new creation, it [the church] can be described both as ‘being’ and as ‘act.’ Its being always remains dependent on the presence and activity of the Holy Spirit, and remains a being in invocation of the Holy Spirit—epicletic being, being that is completely the work of the Spiritus Creator. At the same time, as the work of the Holy Spirit it is also characterized by duration, concreteness, and visibility, and as such is identical with distinct practices or activities, institutions, offices, and doctrines” (ibid., 119). Hütter’s perspective here deeply informs my own.

disciples. As we would expect from Love and Gift, this outpouring configures humans to self-giving love and unites and sanctifies believers.

Let me describe the chapters in a bit more detail. The first chapter focuses on Augustine’s naming of the Spirit but is also a defense of a particular mode of biblical exegesis, one that anticipates the presence of God the Teacher in the biblical texts and that reads them accordingly. The second chapter engages with an array of contemporary theologians, including Hans Urs von Balthasar, Robert Jenson, and especially Dumitru Stăniloae, and also treats at length the views of John Damascene, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Basil the Great. In this second chapter, the pattern for the remainder of the book emerges: I devote the most space to exposition of Thomas Aquinas’s teaching about the Holy Spirit in his *Summa theologiae*.²⁷ Although I could have chosen

²⁷. Lewis Ayres warns that during the period of Leonine neo-Thomism, and even afterward, Catholic historical narratives of the development of trinitarian doctrine “tended . . . to present Latin theology as moving by stages toward a Thomist synthesis” (Ayres, “Into the Cloud of Witnesses: Catholic Trinitarian Theology Beyond and Before Its Modern ‘Revivals,’” in Maspero and Woźniak, *Rethinking Trinitarian Theology*, 4–25, at 10). Ayres goes on to point out that contemporary trinitarian revivalists have often been fueled by a sharp critique of Latin trinitarian theology as a “fall” from true trinitarianism, and that Hegelian and post-Hegelian philosophy (including Schelling’s personalist approach) stand behind many revivalist trinitarian theologies. Here Ayres draws upon the work of Cyril O’Regan, especially his *Gnostic Apocalypse: Jacob Boehme’s Haunted Narrative* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002). Ayres’s purpose is to show that Latin trinitarianism itself has resources for internal critique and revival, once one rejects the “assumption of linear and cumulative progress in Latin theology” (“Into the Cloud of Witnesses,” 11). He emphasizes that “we should be wary of treating [Augustine] as an inchoate Thomas waiting only for the latter to define with clarity the *relatio subsistens*” (ibid., 14). For Ayres, indeed, Augustine “makes little use of the relationship between love and knowledge to explore the relationship between Son and Spirit,” and therefore “the emergence of Thomas’ account of the interrelationship between intellect and will is a story to be traced through attention to post-Augustinian developments, and through attention to developments away from (even if in the wake of) Augustine’s own project” (ibid., 15). My view is that Aquinas’s pneumatology, broadly rooted in certain insights of Augustine, offers valuable truth about the person and work of the Holy Spirit, and so it is important to employ and exposit Aquinas’s pneumatology in dialogue with contemporary theologians—without pretending that Aquinas’s contributions, profound though they are, are the “last word” (an attitude that would be a distortion of the theological enterprise). In distinction from my emphasis on the *Summa theologiae*, more historically focused presentations of Aquinas’s pneumatology have explored the perspectives offered by his *Commentary on the Sentences*, his *Summa contra gentiles*, his *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei*, and his biblical commentaries. See, e.g., Gilles Emery’s *Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas*. For the relationship between Aquinas’s pneumatology and Augustine’s, see Emery, “Trinitarian Theology as Spiritual Exercise in Augustine and Aquinas,” in *Aquinas the Augustinian*, ed. Michael Dauphinais, Barry A. David, and Matthew Levering (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 1–40; Bruce D. Marshall, “Aquinas the Augustinian? On the Uses of Augustine in Aquinas’s Trinitarian Theology,” in Dauphinais, David, and Levering, *Aquinas the Augustinian*, 41–61; Loyer, *God’s Love through the Spirit*, 64–69. See also André Malet’s *Personne et amour dans la théologie trinitaire de saint Thomas d’Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 1956), whose insights have been absorbed by Emery.
a number of other theologians, I selected Aquinas as my touchstone for a vigorous presentation of the Holy Spirit as Love and Gift, in part because Aquinas’s theology of the person and work of the Spirit is so richly developed, and in part because its influence in the West has made Aquinas’s theology of the Spirit a magnet for critical attention and dialogue. 28 Jeremy Wilkins has rightly noted that “the commonplace that the Latin tradition neglected pneumatology, or displaced the concerns of pneumatology into other areas, is not true about Thomas Aquinas.” 29

Chapter 3, which explores the filioque, ends with an extensive discussion of Aquinas’s treatment of this theme in the Summa theologiae. I set up this discussion by first engaging contemporary ecumenical statements, especially the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity’s “The Greek and Latin Traditions regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit,” and then turning to


the vigorous criticisms of Aquinas’s pneumatology offered by Sergius Bulgakov and Vladimir Lossky. In chapter 4, on the Holy Spirit’s work in Jesus himself, I begin with the way in which the biblical scholar James D. G. Dunn foregrounds the Gospels’ testimony to the Spirit’s impelling of Jesus and to Jesus’s unique experience of the Spirit. Through this exegetical lens, I examine Aquinas’s theology of the Spirit’s “missions” to Jesus, who supremely embodies the Gift of Love for our salvation.30 In chapter 5, which treats the Holy Spirit’s work in the church, I start with the ongoing exegetical debate regarding Jesus’s eschatological prophecies about the imminent arrival of the kingdom of God.31 After setting forth the positions of N. T. Wright, James Dunn, and Dale Allison, I argue that scholarship regarding this topic crucially presumes a judgment about the Spirit’s eschatological outpouring among the earliest Christians, to which Paul and the book of Acts testify.32 If the Spirit was indeed poured out, through the risen and exalted Jesus, then the kingdom that Jesus proclaimed has indeed been inaugurated.33 And if the Spirit

30. As Alasdair I. C. Heron observes, “According to the New Testament, Jesus is not only the giver but also the receiver of the Spirit. If that is not kept in view, it is all too easy to absorb pneumatology in christology, and so to reduce the very name ‘Holy Spirit’ to a mere cipher. . . . Christology itself requires pneumatology, not in order to be ‘less christocentric,’ but precisely in order to be christology, the doctrine of Jesus as the Christ, the one anointed with the Spirit” (Heron, The Holy Spirit [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1983], 127). Note also Ian A. McFarland’s correct insistence that “Jesus fulfills his specifically human vocation from conception to glory through the power of the Spirit. In this Jesus shows his likeness to us, since for every human being it is the gift of the Spirit that both constitutes (in creation) and completes (in glory) a person’s human nature” (McFarland, “Spirit and Incarnation: Toward a Pneumatic Chalcedonianism,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 16 [2014]: 143–58, at 158). McFarland adds that as the divine Son, “Jesus has the Spirit in a manner that no one else does,” since “the Holy Spirit is his Spirit” and so “it is impossible for Jesus to lose the Spirit” (ibid.).


32. C. K. Barrett rightly remarks, “No more certain statement can be made about the Christians of the first generation than this: they believed themselves to be living under the immediate government of the Spirit of God. . . . The Church of the first century believed that the Holy Spirit had been poured out upon it in a quite exceptional manner” (Barrett, The Holy Spirit and the Gospel Tradition, 2nd ed. [London: SPCK, 1966], 1–2).

33. Ola Tjørhom suggests that the inauguration here should be understood in terms of sacrament: the church is “an anticipatory sign of God’s kingdom. To be sure, a total identification of signum and res (the sign and the reality it signifies) must be avoided. Yet it remains clear that the church is to be an effective and most real representation of the kingdom” (Tjørhom, Visible Church—Visible Unity: Ecumenical Ecclesiology and “The Great Tradition of the Church”
has been poured out, then the Spirit is even now powerfully at work in the ongoing church, “God’s own people” (1 Pet. 2:9). Aquinas’s presentation of the Holy Spirit’s missions makes theologically manifest the all-encompassing character of the Spirit’s work, as Love and Gift, in configuring the church to the image of Christ’s self-giving love.

Chapter 6 examines the Holy Spirit’s role in uniting the church. I begin with the views of Michael Welker and Kendall Soulen, both of whom emphasize the Spirit’s fruitfulness in human multiplicity and diversity. Aquinas recognizes that the Holy Spirit meets us in our diversity, but he shows that the Spirit’s characteristic work in the church is the strengthening of unity, just as in the Trinity itself the Spirit is associated with unity. The church’s unity does not squelch believers’ diversity, although unity in truth and love does overcome certain kinds of diversity. Chapter 7 takes up the question of whether the church is holy. Again I find Aquinas’s insights helpful, but I note first the ways in which contemporary Reformed theologians and John Calvin seek to affirm the holiness of the church while accounting at the same time for the ways in which the church falls short of holiness. I also discuss the positions of Cyprian and Augustine, who emphasize that the church’s faithful mediation of divine teaching and divine sacraments requires that the church be holy, despite its sinful members.

My point in these final two chapters is that the eschatological outpouring of the Spirit, if it means anything, must mean the establishment and sustaining of a visibly united messianic people of God, possessed of an ecclesial holiness that manifests itself in the faithful mediation of the truth of the gospel and the holy sacraments by which, in faith, we are joined to Jesus Christ. The eschatological outpouring of Love and Gift could mean no less. While real, the unity and holiness of the church remain imperfect on earth, and our configuration to Christ by the Holy Spirit does not override our diversity, but instead enables us to work together in self-giving love as members of Christ’s body.

[Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2004], 63). Certainly the church, as the inaugurated kingdom, is not yet the consummated kingdom, and indeed the difference between the two can be described in sacramental terms so long as one does not separate the church (as a mere sign) from the kingdom. Gerald O’Collins, SJ, comes too close to just such a separation when, as part of an argument regarding the salvation of non-Christians, he argues (indebted especially to Jacques Dupuis, SJ) that “the reign of God is the decisive point of reference. The Church exists for the kingdom and at its service, and not vice versa” (O’Collins, The Second Vatican Council on Other Religions [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013], 195). This disjunctive language, which presents the church as a servant of the kingdom and thus as something that will not be needed when the kingdom fully arrives, construes the church in a merely juridical fashion.

34. As Brian Gaybba says with respect to Augustine’s theology of the Holy Spirit, “One could say that this theology is but the detailed and consistent application of the idea that love unites and, by uniting, transform all it unites” (Gaybba, Spirit of Love, 66).
In short, with regard to the person (chaps. 1–3) and work (chaps. 4–7) of the Holy Spirit, the present book aims to show the value of the names “Love” and “Gift” for illumining the Spirit in his eternal procession and temporal mission to Jesus Christ and the church. Guided especially by Thomas Aquinas, whose theology retains its power to inspire and instruct, I seek to respect the profound mystery of the Spirit—who, as Martin Sabathé remarks, “proceeds from an infinitely mysterious source: the Father and the Son . . . [who] ‘dwell in unapproachable light’ [1 Tim. 6:16]”—while at the same time proclaiming and praising the Spirit in ways warranted by divine revelation. The impetus for this study is well summed up by Jürgen Moltmann: “The gift and the presence of the Holy Spirit is the greatest and most wonderful thing which we can experience.”

There are many other important dimensions of the Spirit’s work that I am unable to address in this book, but for which I hope this book provides some foundational insights and which I hope to treat in the future. These dimensions include the Spirit as Creator, the Spirit’s presence in the natural world, the Spirit’s activity in other religions, the presence of the Holy Spirit among the people of Israel, and the Spirit and prophecy, to name but a few.

37. See, e.g., Colin Gunton, “‘The Spirit Moved over the Face of the Waters’: The Holy Spirit and the Created Order,” in *Spirits of Truth and Power: Studies in Christian Doctrine and Experience*, ed. D. F. Wright (Edinburgh: Rutherford House, 2007), 56–72; Michael Welker, ed., *The Spirit in Creation and New Creation: Science and Theology in Western and Orthodox Realms* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012); Robert L. Hubbard Jr., “The Spirit and Creation,” in *Presence, Power and Promise: The Role of the Spirit of God in the Old Testament*, ed. David G. Firth and Paul D. Wegner (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2011), 71–91. Hubbard notes that Gerhard “von Rad overstated his case against the relationship of the spirit and creation in the OT. Granted, only two texts (Gen. 1:2; Ps. 104:30) expressly link ʾāqā with creation (bāraʾ), but they are telling” (Hubbard, “Spirit and Creation,” 91). As Christian theologians since Justin Martyr have taught, “seeds of the Word” have been present in all cultures throughout history, and the Creator Spirit too has been actively present everywhere (inseparably from the Word). God offers his saving grace to all humans; on this point, see Congar, *I Believe in the Holy Spirit*, 2:118; cf. 2:218–28. But I do not agree with Gerald O’Collins, SJ’s claim that since “revelation” primarily means God’s self-disclosure and since God offers grace (thereby in a certain sense disclosing himself) to everyone, “all divine self-revelation, wherever and whenever it occurs, must accordingly be deemed supernatural in its purpose and nature” and “all events of God’s self-disclosure are supernatural or aimed to gift human beings with unmerited grace here and with glory hereafter” (O’Collins, *Second Vatican Council on Other Religions*, xi). O’Collins rejects any “distinction between ‘super-nature’ and ‘nature’”—in this case between a supernatural revelation granted by God and a merely natural knowledge of God resulting from a human search” (ibid.). See also the discussion of Jacques Dupuis’s theology, in light of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith’s *Dominus Iesus* (2000), in Edward T. Oakes, SJ,
Pneumatological Paths Not Taken: Weinandy, Coakley, Hasker

Before I proceed, some further sense of recent trinitarian theology and pneumatology will be helpful, so as to show more clearly the differentiating characteristics of the path I take in this book. In this section, therefore, I survey and critically evaluate three works, each from influential streams of contemporary thought: trinitarian theology that seeks to retrieve and accentuate the role of the Spirit; postmodern or contextualized trinitarian theology; and social trinitarianism. From the first stream of thought, I focus on Thomas Weinandy’s *The Father’s Spirit of Sonship*; from the second, Sarah Coakley’s *God, Sexuality, and the Self*; and from the third, William Hasker’s *Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God.*

**Thomas Weinandy**

Weinandy’s *The Father’s Spirit of Sonship*, published two decades ago, remains significant for its creative extension of a thesis that gained wide adherence in the twentieth century and continues to be highly influential today, namely that the Holy Spirit is involved in the Son’s procession from the Father. Among the Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant theologians...

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whom Weinandy cites in favor of some version of the view that “the Father begets the Son in the Spirit” are François-Xavier Durrwell, Jürgen Moltmann, Olivier Clément, Paul Evdokimov, and Edward Yarnold. Weinandy does not deny that the Father is the primary principle of the Son. He argues, however, that the Holy Spirit cannot be fully a divine person if the Spirit has solely a passive role as the Father and Son’s Love and Gift. He also raises the concern that Greek and Latin trinitarian theologies were overly influenced in Hinze and Dabney, *Advents of the Spirit*, 315–38, at 334–35. Daley notes with concern that Weinandy “effectively abandons the traditional supposition of a sequential order in the divine persons,” but he appreciates Weinandy’s biblical emphasis on the Spirit’s active role and Weinandy’s characterization of the Spirit “in terms of the relationships implied by personal love rather than in terms of causality” (Daley, “Revisiting the ‘Filioque’: Part Two,” 206). He holds with Weinandy that “perhaps one may . . . conjecture that it is the Spirit’s role even within the triune mystery of God to bring the relationship of Father and Son to its perfection of form” (ibid.). For his part, Studebaker values Weinandy’s critique of “the Western tradition for portraying the Spirit in passive terms,” and he also approves Weinandy’s challenge to “the traditional order of processions among the divine persons—Father, Son, Spirit” (Studebaker, *From Pentecost to the Triune God*, 139). Nonetheless, Studebaker concludes that Weinandy, like those whom Weinandy criticizes, gives the Spirit only an instrumental role: the Father and the Son relate to each other through the Spirit, but they do not relate to the Spirit. For Studebaker too, “Weinandy does not succeed in transcending an immanent order of processions, although he does reconfigure them” (ibid., 145). Studebaker argues that Weinandy’s position requires that “the Spirit, in the first mode of his subsistence, is prior to the subsistence of the Son because the Spirit is the instrument that proceeds from the Father and in whom the Father begets the Son” (ibid.). Studebaker notes that his concern regarding the Spirit’s instrumental role is also expressed by Thomas R. Thompson, review of *The Father’s Spirit of Sonship* by Thomas G. Weinandy, *Calvin Theological Journal* 32 (1997): 195–200. See also Gilles Emery’s critical review of *The Father’s Spirit of Sonship* in *Revue Thomiste* 96 (1996): 152–54. Emery argues that the Rahnerian principle of the identity between the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity leads Weinandy to transpose to the Son, in his divine nature, the action of the Holy Spirit toward the humanity of Christ. Emery also suggests that Weinandy’s approach produces a certain “pneumatomonism,” since for Weinandy it is the Spirit who enables the Father to be Father and the Son to be Son. I would add that emphasis on whether an equal amount of active roles are played by all the persons indicates a misunderstanding of the goal of identifying opposed relations in the order of origin. See also the highly positive appropriations of Weinandy’s position in Myk Habets, *The Anointed Son: A Trinitarian Spirit Christology* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2010); Tomlin, *Prodigal Spirit*, 22–23, 29, 35.

40. Sergius Bulgakov, who influenced Evdokimov and Clément on the Trinitarian *ordo*, could also be named. For criticism see Luis F. Ladaria, *La Trinità, mistero di comunione*, trans. Marco Zapella (Milan: Paoline, 2004), 272–319; as well as Gilles Emery’s trenchant review of Durrwell’s *Jésus, Fils de Dieu dans l’Esprit Saint* (Paris: Desclée, 1997) in *Revue Thomiste* 98 (1998): 471–73. Emery comments, “The trinitarian structure elaborated by F.-X. Durrwell recalls in certain respects the theory proposed earlier by Bulgakov. One does not hesitate to follow Durrwell when he criticizes the idea of a Father-Son relation from which the Spirit would be absent, and when he emphasizes the intimate connection between spiration and generation as well as the eternal presence of the Spirit in the Son. But the conception of a kind of ‘priority’ of the Spirit to the Son (and to the Father) undermines, it seems to us, the order of the divine persons who dwell in the total simultaneity of the processions and in the Trinitarian perichoresis” (ibid., 471 [my translation]).
by the options available in Neoplatonic emanationism and in Aristotelian epistemology (according to which one must know something in order to love it). The key mistake, Weinandy thinks, consists in imagining the Godhead to be simply the Father, out of whom come the Son and the Spirit, rather than recognizing that the Godhead itself is trinitarian. Weinandy holds that all “sequentialism” must be rejected. Instead, “A proper understanding of the Trinity can only be obtained if all three persons, logically and ontologically, spring forth in one simultaneous, nonsequential, eternal act in which each person of the Trinity subsistently defines, and equally is subsistently defined by, the other persons.”

41. From a different perspective, F. LeRon Shults and Andrea Hollingsworth raise similarly serious concerns about Plato and Aristotle in their *The Holy Spirit* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008). They state that “both Platonism and Aristotelianism tended to privilege the concept of *logos* (rational order) over the concept of *pneuma* (dynamic movement), which partly explains why christology (the enfleshment of the divine *Logos*) received more attention during this period than pneumatology (the indwelling of the divine *Spirit*). This privileging was less explicit in the third strand of Middle Platonism, but even the Stoics sometimes seemed to conflate *pneuma* and *logos*, a habit taken over by some early Christian theologians. . . . Interpretations of the Holy Spirit throughout history have certainly not been *controlled* by philosophical approaches, but they have no doubt been *conditioned* by critical engagement with them” (ibid., 12).

42. Thomas G. Weinandy, OFMCap, *The Father’s Spirit of Sonship: Reconceiving the Trinity* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 14–15. By contrast, as Christopher A. Beeley states, Gregory of Nazianzus would reject any notion of Trinitarian *perichoresis* that conceives of the divine life as being purely reciprocal and not eternally based in the monarchy of the Father—as if, once the Father establishes the consubstantial Trinity, the hierarchical structure of the divine generations gives way to a purely reciprocal exchange of Divinity. Gregory is insistent that the three persons do not mingle with one another in such a way that their identities relative to one another change . . . and he is equally clear that the Father is always the source of Divinity in the Son and the Spirit. . . . Even though the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit continually pour out and return the divine being and so can be said mutually to inhere in one another, it is always, in an eternally prior sense, the Father’s divine being that they share. The entire process of divine generation and reception is caused by and originates with God the Father. (Beeley, *Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light We Shall See Light* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008], 212–13)

Note also the protest lodged by Photius against (as he thought) the logic of the *filioque*: For if the Son and the Spirit came forth from the same cause, that is to say, the Father, and if—as this blasphemy cries out—the Spirit also proceeds from the Son, then why not simply tear up the Word and propagate the fable that the Spirit also produces the Son, thereby according the same dignity to each person by allowing each person to produce the other person? For if each person is in the other, then of necessity each is the cause and completion of the other. And not according to any different manner—by no means!—even if you say that the Spirit proceeds and the Son is begotten! For reason demands equality for each person so that each person exchanges the grace of causality indistinguishably. (Saint Photios, *The Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit*, trans. Joseph P. Farrell [Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1987], §3, p. 60)
According to Weinandy, overcoming sequentialism allows for a proper understanding of the eternal coequality and coactivity of the divine persons. It also enables theologians to read biblical texts more insightfully. For example, he interprets John 4:24, “God is spirit,” to mean that without the Spirit, God cannot be God. The Jewish people already knew that God is spirit. But they did not know God’s trinitarian nature. To know the Father correctly requires knowing the Spirit, in whom the Father is Father. Weinandy observes, “Love (the Spirit) is what makes the Father the Father for it is in love that he begets the Son and it is love (the Spirit) that makes the Son the Son for it is in the Spirit, in whom he is begotten, that he loves the Father.”

43. Weinandy, *The Father’s Spirit of Sonship*, 50. Note also the comment of François-Xavier Durrwell, *The Holy Spirit of God: An Essay in Biblical Theology*, trans. Benedict Davies, OSB (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1986), 139: “it is in the Spirit that there is a Father and a Son; by reason of the third person, there exists a first and a second . . . . In the Spirit God leaves himself and is carried towards the Son and himself becomes what he is: the Father.” Boris Bobrinskoy too insists that “if it is true that the Son is not extraneous to the procession of the Holy Spirit (without bringing in the idea of causality), on the other hand neither is the Holy Spirit extraneous, exterior to the generation of the Son” (Bobrinskoy, “The Filioque Yesterday and Today,” 145) (cf. Bobrinskoy, *The Mystery of the Trinity: Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the Biblical and Patristic Tradition*, trans. Anthony P. Gythiel [Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1999], 71: “the Son and the Spirit come simultaneously from the Father, without it being possible to establish a gap between a first moment and a second moment, the Spirit being present and participating in the eternal generation”). More recently, David Bentley Hart has advocated the same case: “the Son is begotten in and by the agency of the Spirit as much as the Spirit proceeds through the Son, inasmuch as the incarnation, unction, and even mission (Mark 1:12) of the Son are works of the Spirit, which must enter into our understanding of the Trinitarian taxis” (Hart, “The Mirror of the Infinite: Gregory of Nyssa on the Vestigia Trinitatis,” in *Rethinking Gregory of Nyssa*, ed. Sarah Coakley [Oxford: Blackwell, 2003], 111–31, at 129n11). Although I disagree with Weinandy et al. here, I can agree with the more limited claim of Emmanuel Durand, OP, that “the understanding of generation would be incomplete without taking into account the love that accompanies it in every father worthy of the name . . . . Connected to the very act of generation that eternally places the Son as the Beloved of the Father, the Spirit proceeds as precisely this love of the Father for the Son” (Durand, “Perichoresis: A Key Concept for Balancing Trinitarian Theology,” in Maspero and Woźniak, *Rethinking Trinitarian Theology*, 177–92, at 185). Durand adds, “Without being principle of the Son in any way, the Holy Spirit is nevertheless eternally present in the very ‘place’ of his eternal birth (in sinu Patris), as the paternal Love that eternally ‘hypostates’ itself in its reposing on the Son. The Son is himself fully Son in the very fact that He returns this same Love to the Father in eternal thanksgiving” (ibid.). What both Durand and Weinandy wish to emphasize is that (in Durand’s words) “the paternal-filial relation cannot completely express the Persons of the Father and the Son in their Trinitarian perfection without the implication of the proper relativity of the Spirit” (ibid., 187). This is true, but it cannot be taken to mean that the Father’s generation of the Son is imperfect in itself, as though the Son were not “fully Son” as generated by the Father. Durand credits the patristic and medieval theologians with eliminating “any connotation of anteriority-posteriority or superiority-inferiority from the concept of order, to keep from origin only the relationship of that which has a principle to its principle” (ibid.). Durand’s position on these matters echoes that of his mentor Jean-Miguel Garrigues’s *Le Saint-Esprit sceau de*
full appreciation of the eternal perichoretic relations of the three persons, we can recognize that the Holy Spirit must be actively present in the relation of the Father and the Son.44 The alternative would be to imagine the Spirit as absent at first, as though there were originally just a Father, and then just a Father and Son, from whom the Spirit proceeds.

Does Weinandy therefore reject the Father’s “monarchy”? He does not, but rather he argues that the “monarchy of the Father as well as the unity of the Trinity will only be rightly understood if an appropriate active role is given to the Holy Spirit.”45 This is because the Father begets the Son in love. The Father is never without a fatherly love for his Son. Indeed, this fatherly love is present in the Father’s monarchy as the source of the Son. Weinandy states that “the Spirit proceeds from the Father as the fatherly Love in whom or by whom the Son is begotten.”46 If there were no fatherly Love, no Spirit, there would be no begetting and no Son. The Father’s monarchy is not challenged by this because knowing and loving, begetting and spirating are utterly simultaneous in God. In Weinandy’s view, however, not even a logical priority holds with respect to the Trinity, since such priority is merely the philosophical fruit of Aristotelian epistemology.47 The Father’s monarchy requires that the Spirit be

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44. On trinitarian perichoresis, see Durand, “Perichoresis”; Durand, La périchorèse des personnes divines: Immanence mutuelle, réciprocité et communion (Paris: Cerf, 2005). For Durand, following Bonaventure, “perichoresis is a concept that integrates unity of essence and personal distinction” (“Perichoresis,” 178). Durand argues that in Aquinas we nonetheless find “a certain subordination of the relation of the Father and Son to the Spirit in relationship to the relation of the Father to the Son” (ibid.). I do not think that this is the case. Durand later observes, correctly, that “divine generation cannot be fully understood without its intrinsic connection to the procession of the Spirit as the Love of the Father for the Son. Thus even if an order between generation and procession exists, it is free of all posteriority or subordination, and in no way represents a juxtaposition of two independent acts in the divine life” (ibid., 183). For an approach to the relationship of divine essence and persons via redoublement and subsisting relation, see Gilles Emery, OP, “Essentialism or Personalism in the Treatise on God in St. Thomas Aquinas?,” in Trinity in Aquinas, trans. Teresa Bede et al., 2nd ed. (Ann Arbor, MI: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2006), 165–208.

45. Weinandy, Father’s Spirit of Sonship, 65. Weinandy, I expect, would fully agree with John Milbank’s point (with which I also concur) that Thomas Aquinas rightly holds that “the non-reversibility of spiration from the Father through the Son indicates precisely not an ‘order of power,’ but only an ‘order of supposita’” (Milbank, “Second Difference,” 176).

46. Weinandy, Father’s Spirit of Sonship, 69.

47. By contrast, John Zizioulas argues, “The generating is first, for it cannot be logically placed after the generated one, albeit not in the sense of a ‘given’ entity, since it is established in relationship with the generated (and the spirated) one, but only because of the difference of their hypostatic properties (generator, generated, spirated). Trinitarian hierarchy (first-second-third) is therefore not to be understood as an order of individuals ontologically established in that particular taxis, but as an order implied in their distinct hypostatic properties: agennētos,
fully active and present in the begetting of the Son, because the Father begets with love. As Weinandy explains, “The Father is the Father because, in the one act by which he is eternally constituted as the Father, the Spirit proceeds as the Love (Life and Truth) in whom the Son is begotten of the Father.” 48 The Father retains his “monarchy” as the paternal fount of divinity, but the Son and Spirit possess active roles too in accord with a nonsequentialist approach. Thus Weinandy can say, without in his view removing the Father’s monarchy, that “it is by the Spirit that the Father substantiates or ‘persons’ himself as Father because it is by the Spirit that he begets the Son.” 49

Yet, if the Father becomes the Father “by the Spirit,” why does this formulation not give (atemporal) precedence to the Spirit? Even if the Father remains the monarchical fount, it seems that the Father does so only because of the Spirit, who thereby seems to be the fount of the fount, or at least a co-fount. Weinandy responds by underscoring that the trinitarian order cannot be envisioned in terms of a linear Neoplatonic emanationism. No logical priority or sequence accords with the perichoretic, eternal mystery of the Trinity. The Father’s monarchy is sustained because the Son and Spirit proceed from the Father. But this does not mean that the Son and Spirit themselves lack an active role. The Spirit plays this active role even in the begetting of the Son, so that the Spirit “persons the Father as Father” even while being “personed by the Father and Son.” 50

48. Weinandy, Father’s Spirit of Sonship, 72.
49. Ibid., 73.
50. Aristotle Papanikolaou argues along the same lines, though even more strongly: “the Son causes the Father and the Spirit to be, . . . the Spirit causes the Father and the Son to be; as much as the Father causes the Son and the Spirit to be. The identity of each person is dependent on the other persons. On the level of freedom, each person being the cause of the existence of the other persons means that each person freely confirms their free will to exist in communion with other persons, and by so doing, causes the existence of the other as person” (Papanikolaou, Being with God: Trinity, Apophaticism, and Divine-Human Communion [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006], 151).
Weinandy employs the name “Word” to make the same point. To speak a word requires breath. In God, the Son is the Word and the Spirit is the “breath.” The Father cannot speak the Word unless the Father “already” has breath.\(^{51}\) As Weinandy notes, Clément, Boff, and Moltmann make this same point. Weinandy sums up his position as advocating a “perichoresis of action within the Trinity,” so that the Father is the source of all, and yet the other two have their own active role.\(^{52}\) He recognizes that this meaning of *perichōrēsis* transforms the traditional meanings of *perichōrēsis/circumcessio* in the East and West, which were predicated respectively upon Neoplatonic and Aristotelian doctrines. In his view, the active role of the Holy Spirit is necessary for affirming the full divine personhood of the Spirit.\(^{53}\)

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51. See Weinandy, *Father’s Spirit of Sonship*, 75.
52. Ibid., 78.
53. See also Weinandy’s “Clarifying the *Filioque*,” which appears on pages 355–67 of Thomas G. Weinandy, OFMCap, Paul McPartlan, and Stratford Caldecott, “Clarifying the *Filioque*: The Catholic-Orthodox Dialogue,” *Communio* 23 (1996): 354–73. In this essay, which is a response to the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity’s 1995 document “The Greek and Latin Traditions regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit,” Weinandy argues that “the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches need to formulate a new common Creed, one that embodies the past, but equally one that transcends or goes beyond the past. Thus together, the East and the West must achieve a true development of the doctrine of the Trinity, comparable
Sarah Coakley

Sarah Coakley’s *God, Sexuality and the Self: An Essay “On the Trinity”* provides another contemporary creative reading of the Holy Spirit, from a self-consciously postmodern/feminist Anglican perspective. Her emphasis is on desire, divine and human.54 She develops “a vision of God’s trinitarian nature as both the source and goal of human desires,” and she seeks to show “how God the ‘Father,’ in and through the Spirit, both stirs up, and progressively chastens and purges, the trailer and often misdirected desires of humans, and so forges them, by stages of sometimes painful growth, into the likeness of his Son.”55 Her work stands broadly in the line of Christian
to the doctrinal development obtained at Nicaea and Constantinople. . . . I conclude by making bold to offer what the new Creed might contain: “We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord the Giver of Life, who comes forth (*ekporeuetai*) from and through the Son as the one in whom the Son is begotten and who proceeds (*proēsi*) from and through the Son in communion with the Father, and together with the Father and the Son is worshiped and glorified” (ibid., 367).

Weinandy restates the position of his book as follows:

While there is an order of origin and derivation among the Persons of the Trinity, there is not an order of priority, precedence and sequence. . . . A proper understanding of the Trinity can be obtained only if all three Persons, logically and ontologically, spring forth in one simultaneous, nonsequential, eternal act in which each Person of the Trinity subsistently defines, and equally is subsistently defined by, the other Persons. . . . I would argue that the Father begets the Son in or by the Holy Spirit, that is, that the Spirit proceeds (*ekporeuetai*) simultaneously from the Father as the one in whom the Son is begotten. The Spirit, then, who proceeds from the Father as the one in whom the Father begets the Son, both conforms or defines (persons) the Father to be the Father. The Holy Spirit, in proceeding from the Father as the one in whom the Father begets the Son, conforms the Father to be Father for the Son and conforms the Son to be Son for (of) the Father and is equally conformed, defined (personed) by the Father (*principaliter*) and the Son to be the Spirit of both. (ibid., 363–64)

In his contribution to the symposium, “Concluding Comments” (370–73), Caldecott defends Weinandy’s position against criticisms made by McPartlan. Caldecott offers a diagram of a circle with a line through it and explains that the line (the generation of the Son) is analogously “the gulf between Self and Other” (ibid., 371). He then argues that “the Father ‘breathes forth’ the Holy Spirit as a circular movement that by definition returns to him. The Spirit traverses the same ‘distance’ as the Son (the distance from Self to Other, thus constituting a third, distinct Person), but in a different way, the way of *spiration*. In a sense it is the Spirit who brings the Son back to the Father, overcoming otherness in the communion of love. It might equally be said that the Spirit leads the Son away from the Father ‘before’ leading him back” (ibid., 372). This analogy from Self and Other, construed psychologically and spatially, strikes me as unhelpful, not least in its construal of trinitarian “otherness.”


Platonism, insofar as she sees desire as drawing us constantly toward God; an analysis of desire will lead us to ascend beyond embodied sexual desire (without thereby negating its goodness) and to recognize that when we desire, we desire union with the Good, with Beauty itself. She argues that desire, *eros*, “is an ontological category belonging primarily to God,” although as a divine attribute, desire does not indicate any lack. As a divine attribute, desire “connotes that plenitude of longing love that God has for God’s own creation and for its full and ecstatic participation in the divine, trinitarian, life.” The incarnation makes clear that in this movement of God’s desire for us, and our desire for God, we do not need to jettison bodiliness. We must simply learn—as Christ exemplifies for us—to place desire for God at the center of everything we are and do.

In this context, Coakley conceives of the Holy Spirit’s work as consisting in inflaming us with desire for God and purifying our desires. She describes the Holy Spirit as “the vibrant point of contact and entry into the flow of this divine desire, the irreplaceable mode of invitation for the cracking open of the crooked human heart.” She speaks of the Spirit consistently in terms of desire: the Spirit is the one whose work consists in “alluring, delighting,

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57. Ibid. See also David Hart’s remarks, in critical dialogue with Gilles Deleuze, in his *Beauty of the Infinite*. Hart states that “for Christian thought, the true creativity of desire must be inseparable from charity” (Hart, *Beauty of the Infinite*, 269). Drawing upon Maximus the Confessor (and exhibiting his own speculative and rhetorical gifts), Hart explains further, “In God desire both evokes and is evoked; it is one act that for us can be grasped only by analogy to that constant dynamism within our being that comprises the distinct but inseparable moments of interior energy and exterior splendor. In the life of the Trinity, the other is given by desire and also calls forth desire; God is both address and response, gift and appealing radiance. And it is of this love that both ventured forth and is drawn out that creation is a rephrasing, an ‘object’ of divine delight precisely in being a gift of divine love, shining within the infinitely accomplished joy—the *apatheia*—of the Trinity” (ibid., 270). For a similarly fruitful emphasis on “our desire-love,” as well as the claim that “a full Trinitarian theology should be a mystical theology of union,” see David Tracy, “Trinitarian Theology and Spirituality: Retrieving William of St. Thierry for Contemporary Theology,” in Maspero and Woźniak, *Rethinking Trinitarian Theology*, 387–420, here quoted at 406–7.

inflaming, in its propulsion of divine desire.”59 This movement of desire, of course, is unitive, but the unity that it establishes does not do away with distinction. Coakley states that “the Spirit is no less also a means of distinguishing hiatus: both within God, and in God’s relations to creation. It is what makes God irreducibly three, simultaneously distinguishing and binding Father and Son, and so refusing also—by analogous outreach—the mutual narcissism of even the most delighted of human lovers.”60 Union and distinction are both the work of the Holy Spirit. It is important to note here that Coakley envisions the Spirit’s work in us to be inseparable from Christ’s saving work: thus “the Spirit progressively ‘breaks’ sinful desires, in and through the passion of Christ,” so that the Spirit both propels us toward divine union and corrects our fallen desires “to possess, abuse, and control.”61

Coakley goes on to compare two biblical models of the Holy Spirit. In the first model, found in John’s Gospel and in Acts, the Holy Spirit shares with the church the relationship of the Father and the Son; the Holy Spirit’s role here is secondary. In the second model, the Holy Spirit incorporates believers into the trinitarian life and has a much more central role. Coakley explains that in this Pauline model “the Holy Spirit is construed not simply as extending the revelation of Christ, nor even merely as enabling Christ’s recognition, but as actually catching up the created realm into the life of God.”62 Coakley calls this Pauline model “incorporative,” and she judges it to be more adequate to the Spirit than the Johannine and Lukan model, which she terms “linear.” Paul’s incorporative model of the Spirit, found paradigmatically in Romans 8, gives the Spirit a central activity of his own in salvation history, one that is in a certain sense distinct from the “linear” economy of salvation. This model of the Spirit (and thus of the Spirit’s personal distinctiveness) comes to the fore, Coakley argues, particularly in the experience of prayer, as Romans 8 suggests. In Coakley’s view, the incorporative model of the Spirit, which gives “experiential priority to the Spirit in prayer” and which allows for “a

59. Ibid. Note also Rowan Williams’s insight that “to speak of the Spirit’s presence in the church is to speak of that dimension of the life of Christ’s body that is consumed with longing. At the heart of the church, there is a yearning to be what God designs us to be, a yearning to receive the full gifts that God wants us to receive—and that carries with it the implication that there is indeed something that we are for. . . . The Spirit in us is desire, not any old desire, but the desire towards the unreachable God, who is also the God who has himself reached out to us and put the Spirit of his Son into our hearts” (Williams, “Holy Spirit in the Bible,” in J. Williams, Holy Spirit in the World Today, 64–71, at 65–66). Williams connects this desire or passion with Christ’s passion: the Holy Spirit leads us to share in Christ’s radical self-offering. This “self-emptying means being filled with the energy of gift and being fully alive” (ibid., 68).
61. Ibid., 14–15.
62. Ibid., 111.
simultaneous [rather than linear] experience of ‘Father,’ ‘Son,’ and ‘Spirit,’” has tended to stimulate pneumatologically rich, ascetically rigorous, prophetic movements that find themselves at the margins of the established and/or hierarchical church (and that encourage women’s leadership). Examining the views of the early fathers of the church, Coakley focuses on the connections between the priority of ecstatic experience of the Spirit, erotic desire for incorporation into the Trinity, and an ambiguous “renegotiation of gender” vis-à-vis sexuality and leadership.

Coakley credits the monastic movement for keeping alive the priority of the ecstatic experience of the Holy Spirit, and for energizing Athanasius’s mature commitment to the coequality of the Spirit and his corresponding interest in Romans 8’s incorporative pneumatology. Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine both evince at least moments of incorporative pneumatological logic, as do, of course, many medieval mystical theologians. She devotes a full chapter to a comparative study of Gregory and Augustine on gender, prayer, and the Trinity. She finds that Gregory’s mystical writings allow for the priority of “the Spirit’s lure into the life of the Godhead,” whereas his earlier doctrinal treatises “are more infected by a safe ‘linear’ and hierarchical ordering of the persons than is suggested by Paul’s vision in Romans 8 of the ‘reflexive’ answering of Spirit to Father in and through the pray-er.” By contrast, she finds Augustine’s view of gender to underwrite the subordination of women more than does Gregory. Yet in book 15 of Augustine’s De Trinitate, she identifies the incorporative pneumatology with its emphasis on inflaming desire and trinitarian indwelling. She connects the incorporative pneumatological

63. Ibid., 116. From a different angle, Gary Tyra seeks to stimulate prophetic Christian movements and to equip them to reevangelize Europe and North America, building upon Lesslie Newbigin’s famous observation that Europe and North America are now mission fields. He argues that “the remarkable spread of Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity around the world in recent years can be attributed, at least in part, to the dynamic of prophetic activity taking place in the lives of rank-and-file church members. This realization offers hope that a similar missional faithfulness can be experienced in Western, industrialized nations should the dynamic of prophetic activity be rediscovered by the evangelicals living within them” (Tyra, The Holy Spirit in Mission: Prophetic Speech and Action in Christian Witness [Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2011], 34–35). Although in the present book I discuss the Holy Spirit’s guidance of the church’s teachings, I have left a fuller discussion of individual proclamation and preaching—a central engine of practical evangelization, and what Tyra has in view when he uses the phrase “prophetic speech”—for a future book.

64. Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 132.

65. Coakley is less positive about Basil the Great, who seems to “redistinguish” the Son and Spirit in a linear movement of the economy (see ibid., 138).

66. Ibid., 287. For reflection on Gregory of Nyssa’s pneumatology, see Khaled Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea: The Development and Meaning of Trinitarian Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011), 204–12.
dimensions of Gregory and Augustine with Pseudo-Dionysius’s depiction “of a divine ecstatic yearning meeting and incorporating a responsive human, ecstatic yearning.”67

The passage from Pseudo-Dionysius’s *The Divine Names* that Coakley examines in some detail is found in 4.12–17. There Dionysius notes that “some of our writers on sacred matters have thought the title ‘yearning’ to be more divine than ‘love.’”68 He quotes Ignatius of Antioch as well as Wisdom of Solomon 8:2: “I loved her and sought her from my youth, and I desired to take her for my bride, and I became enamored of [or: yearned for] her beauty.”69 Dionysius holds that “yearning” (*eros*) and “love” (*agapē*) are synonymous. He recognizes, of course, that some theologians reject the name “yearning” as inapplicable to God, a fact that he attributes to their inability “to grasp the simplicity of the one divine yearning,” because they think of erotic desire solely in bodily, divided terms.70 For Dionysius, yearning, when applied to God, signifies “a capacity to effect a unity, an alliance, and a particular commingling in the Beautiful and the Good.”71 He goes on to explain the standing of *eros* in God: “It is a capacity which preexists through the Beautiful and the Good. It is dealt out from the Beautiful and the Good through the Beautiful and the Good. It binds the things of the same order in a mutually regarding union.”72 Love involves yearning or desire, because love goes out to the beloved ecstatically, so that the lover belongs to the beloved. Our yearning or desire is a participation in the divine yearning or desire. Thus theologians should name God “Yearning and Love,” *Eros* and *Agapē*, because God himself “is yearning on the move, simple, self-moved, self-acting, preexistent in the Good, flowing out from the Good onto all that is and returning once again to the Good.”73 The divine yearning moves in a circular fashion, “always proceeding, always remaining, always being restored to itself.”74

Coakley points out that in making this argument, Dionysius is relying on Proclus as well as seeking to connect this view of *eros* with Paul. She also

underscores that, *pace* Sigmund Freud, it turns out here that sexual desire is, ultimately, sublimated desire for God rather than the converse. Yet as she notes, Dionysius does not make a connection to the Trinity, let alone to gender (or, of specific interest to Coakley, to the issue of gendered naming of the Trinity).

The question of the *filioque* provides Coakley, at the end of her book, with a way of drawing out the trinitarian significance of envisioning God in terms of the attribute of desire. Insisting upon the Spirit’s primary role against linear subordinationism, she suggests that understanding the divine persons in terms of processions causes problems unless one recognizes that processions “are about the perfect mutual ontological desire that only the Godhead instantiates.”75 The Father alone cannot be the source of the Trinity, since otherwise the linear model would be unavoidable. Rather, since divine desire is ecstatic, the Father must be a “source” whose status depends upon the activity of the other two persons, activity that Coakley describes as “the Spirit’s reflexive propulsion and the Son’s creative effulgence.”76 The point is that each person must be the “source,” in some way, of the other two. This fits with divine desire, which is ecstatic: each person enacts both “active plentitude and longing love” vis-à-vis the other two persons.77 The Spirit’s role must be accentuated if this fully mutual, ecstatic sourcing is to be appreciated; otherwise the linear Father-Son model, with the Spirit as an extrinsic and subordinated add-on, will predominate. The Father is “source” only in the Son and through the Spirit; the Son has his source in the Father through the Spirit; the Spirit too is “sourced” by the Father and the Son. The mutual ecstasis of desire, rather than linear processions, characterizes the trinitarian persons. We come to know this when our own desires have been rightly purified by the Holy Spirit, so that we can participate in the reflexive, vulnerable movements of divine ecstasis.

**William Hasker**

My third representative contemporary approach to the Holy Spirit is the social trinitarianism of William Hasker. Hasker draws upon Carl Mosser (who himself is critical of social trinitarianism) to provide a fourfold definition of the constituent elements of social trinitarianism: “1. Inter-personal unity is irreducibly social in nature; 2. The members of the Trinity are persons in the full, modern sense; 3. Therefore, the unity of the Trinity is genuinely social in

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76. Ibid. For patristic and medieval concerns regarding this kind of approach, see Marshall, “Filioque as Theology and Doctrine,” 281–82.
nature; 4. The divine persons interpenetrate, co-inhere, and mutually indwell one another in *perichoresis.*" For Hasker, it is particularly important to insist that the divine persons have “personhood” in the modern sense of the term. He largely grants the need for analogy rather than strict univocity in speaking of divine realities, but not so as to make the personhood of the divine persons less than that connoted by the modern sense of “personhood.” In this regard, he returns frequently and with approval to Cornelius Plantinga’s contention that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit must be distinct centers of consciousness with distinct knowledge, will, and action.

Like Coakley, Hasker devotes sustained attention to Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine. Regarding Gregory of Nyssa, Hasker’s main interest consists in inquiring whether *On “Not Three Gods,” to Ablabius* supports social trinitarianism. He emphasizes that in this work, Gregory argues that when Peter, James, and John are referred to as “three men,” this is a mistake, since it implies that there are three human natures. The same, then, holds for the Father, Son, and Spirit: they too share one nature and should be called one God. Further, Gregory contends that the Father himself does not judge humans because the Father has committed all judgment to the Son. In *Contra Eunomium* too Gregory attributes to the Son a number of actions not possessed by the Father. Thus for Gregory, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit share a nature in a manner similar to (though not identical with) the way that three men do, and the Son performs distinct actions that the Father does not do. Although he is well aware of arguments to the contrary, Hasker concludes that Gregory supports the basic contentions of social trinitarianism. Indebted to Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, Hasker notes that even Gregory’s version of divine simplicity differs from the strict version adopted by Augustine and others. Here Hasker employs an essay by Richard Cross, in which Cross argues that


classical trinitarian theology holds both that the divine person is the same as the divine essence and that relations are mental rather than real, as evidence that divine simplicity in its stronger forms logically negates trinitarian doctrine of any kind.\textsuperscript{80}

Hasker takes as confirmation of Augustine’s support for the basic contention of social trinitarianism the fact that Augustine holds that not only the Holy Spirit loves in the Trinity but rather the Father loves, the Son loves, and the Holy Spirit loves. If each person loves, this must mean—so Hasker concludes—that each person is a distinct center of consciousness. Further, if the Father and Son have mutual love, as Augustine says they do, it again follows that each person must be a distinct center of consciousness.\textsuperscript{81} Hasker argues

\textsuperscript{80} See Richard Cross, “Latin Trinitarianism: Some Conceptual and Historical Considerations,” in McCall and Rea, \textit{Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity}, 201–13. For a more recent proposal by Cross, promoting the approach of John Duns Scotus among others, see his “Medieval Trinitarianism and Modern Theology,” in Maspero and Woźniak, \textit{Rethinking Trinitarian Theology}, 26–43. Comparing “social trinitarianism” with “Latin trinitarianism,” Cross argues that “if Latin views are construed as entailing that the only feature that one person can possess uniquely is a relation (to the other persons), then Latin trinitarianism must be false. My reason for holding this is that the only obvious rationale for accepting trinitarianism is the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, and this doctrine seems to entail that at least one person possesses a set of properties—i.e., human properties—that the other persons do not possess” (Cross, “Medieval Trinitarianism and Modern Theology,” 43). In my view, the incarnate Son’s contingent properties—those that he possesses in virtue of the incarnation, such as being born of the Virgin Mary—must be carefully distinguished from the eternal relational properties that distinguish the Son in the Trinity. The properties that the Son obtains in virtue of the incarnation pertain to his humanity and neither change the eternal Son nor distinguish the Son, as Son, from the Father or the Holy Spirit. In the strict sense, whose full meaning remains beyond our reach due to the divine incomprehensibility (which pertains as much to the divine persons as to the divine essence), the property that eternally distinguishes the Son is only his opposed relation to the Father in the order of origin. See also Cross’s controversial \textit{The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

\textsuperscript{81} Hasker is frequently in dialogue here with the work of Lewis Ayres, and he argues that Ayres (like Augustine) runs into trouble regarding the doctrine of the persons’ unity of will/operation and the doctrine of divine simplicity; see Hasker, \textit{Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God}, 48–49 and 58–59, citing Ayres, \textit{Nicaea and Its Legacy}, 292–301, 319, 378–80; and Ayres, \textit{Augustine and the Trinity} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 320–25. For his part, Ayres points out that “Augustine’s pattern of ‘redoublement’ does not proceed via an examination of the language of persons and essence, but via the interweaving of two strands of exegesis and philosophical reflection. The first strand focuses on the divine three as active agents, and here Augustine seems to have moved cautiously towards an account of the three as existing dynamically \textit{ad aliquid}. . . . The second strand of discourse focuses on the divine three as each being the one fullness of the Godhead and as also the fullness of the indivisible Godhead inseparably with the others” (Ayres, \textit{Augustine and the Trinity}, 260–61). Note also Gilles Emery’s explanation of the necessity of “redoublement” in trinitarian theology according to Aquinas, for whom the mysteries of the Triune God require two distinct approaches: “The complexity of our knowledge of the mystery, faced with the impossibility of extracting the persons from
that Augustine’s strong doctrine of divine simplicity necessarily implies unitarianism and must be rejected. He also points out that the patristic rejection of patripassianism means that the Father and the Son have distinct actions. Indeed, Scripture’s testimony to the Father and Son would otherwise make no sense. In Scripture, we find the Father and Son acting vis-à-vis each other with distinct, conscious intentionality, a point that Hasker considers to be validated in Khaled Anatolios’s interpretation of Athanasius. 82

In the New Testament, Hasker finds that the Holy Spirit receives significantly less attention, at least as an explicitly personal agent, than do the Father and the Son. He notes that although the Spirit is depicted in personal terms in Romans 8:26–27, Ephesians 4:30, and John 14:26, nonetheless “the Spirit was not made the center of attention, reflection, and worship as was Jesus Christ. Rather, the Spirit was the energizing power that made faith in Christ, and the new life in Christ, possible.” 83 Even the fourth-century Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed does not explicitly affirm the coequal divinity of the Holy Spirit. Yet Hasker, of course, affirms the Spirit’s coequal divinity. The divine nature (“God”) does not exist on its own, but rather exists solely as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Further, the Spirit is never independent of the Father and Son in the sense of autonomy; rather, all three persons are intimately and supremely united. They are distinct in will, but they are also united in will by perfect love. 84 Even so, the Holy Spirit (like the Father and
the Son) can and does will things that the other two persons do not will. The Holy Spirit has free will, so that his will is not governed by the will of the Father or the Son. The trinitarian persons, in other words, enjoy real and fully personal relationships with one another, but they do so without the conflict that mars the human relationships that we see around us.

Hasker insists that the persons share “a singular concrete divine nature,” but how could they do so if they have distinct consciousness? How can they be of one concrete nature if they relate to one another in I-thou relationships? Seeking to understand how this could be so, Hasker examines the case of commissurotomy (surgically split brains), in which at least in some instances a person seems to develop two centers of consciousness. He also examines evidence for psychiatric cases of multiple personality. His suggestion is that if one human mind can support multiple consciousnesses, so too, analogously, can God. A human mind here is the “constituting” element, while the multiple consciousnesses are what is constituted. In the case of God, the constituting element is the one concrete divine nature, and what are constituted are the three divine persons. The divine nature could conceivably not have sustained three persons, but in fact it does sustain three persons. Hasker concludes that “the one concrete divine nature sustains eternally the three distinct life-streams of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and that in virtue of this nature constitutes each of the persons although it is not identical with the persons.” In his view, this “constitution relation” saves Augustine’s claim, based on a strong doctrine of divine simplicity, that the persons and the essence do not really differ in God, since each person is fully God.

**Critique of the Three Approaches**

Each of the three paths described above represents a significant stream of contemporary trinitarian thought in general and pneumatological thought in particular. Why, then, do I not follow any of these paths in this book? Let me begin with Hasker’s analytic social trinitarianism. He and I part ways when it comes to thinking about the divine nature. He suggests that divine nature can be defined in terms of a set of properties that, when added together, provide all the necessary properties for a divine entity. It seems to me that a better way is to begin with God’s instruction to Moses, “Say this to the people of terms apply only analogously, not univocally, to the divine persons, see Khaled Anatolios, “Personhood, Communion, and the Trinity in Some Patristic Texts,” in Anatolios, *Holy Trinity in the Life of the Church*, 147–64.

86. Ibid., 244.
87. Ibid., 245.
Israel, ‘I AM has sent me to you’” (Exod. 3:14). What would it take for God to be in an absolutely unbounded way, so that he can name himself simply in terms of the verb “to be”? The notion that the act of being is merely one property among others is not sufficient here. Rather than existing in a limited or dependent mode, God must exist in an infinite, utterly unlimited mode, and thus be describable as pure actuality with no potentiality (no limitation of act) whatsoever. I thus do not think that Hasker’s “constitution” model of the divine nature works. The three persons that he describes have a finite mode of being; their distinct consciousness, knowledge, will, and activity delimit their being from the being of the other two divine persons. They are not infinite, unrestricted act, since their act comes up against a boundary, namely the differentiation of their actuality from the actuality of the other two persons. What Hasker has described are, metaphysically speaking, three finite entities, no matter if each one is eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, and so forth. These can only be three gods—powerful and divinelike, no doubt, but not the transcendent, infinite, uncreated, pure actuality whose existence is utterly self-sufficient in every way.

Hasker arrives at this view of the three persons in part because of his failure to seriously explore classical metaphysics. However, he also finds this conclusion to be necessary because of his frequently reiterated view that otherwise one will be forced into unitarianism. For Hasker, the patristic doctrine of divine simplicity is, for the trinitarian, incoherent and unthinkable. If the persons are literally the same as the essence, so that the divine essence in one person literally differs in no way from the divine essence in another person, then the persons are likewise identical. As I noted above, he bases this conclusion upon a statement from Richard Cross to the effect that relations are solely in the mind. But he does not address the point made by a number of theologians that, if there are real relations in God, these relations not only are God, but also subsist distinctly. They are not mere mental constructs. Rather, they are in God (and thus are God) but are toward the other person in the relation of origin. Hasker leaves the theory of subsisting relations entirely uninvestigated.

The reasons for Hasker’s neglect of the theory of subsisting relations, and for his failure to understand cognate proposals prior to the full medieval development of this theory, are no doubt complex. It is clear, however, that one of the reasons is that he does not think that a subsisting relation can

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88. See the important concerns raised with respect to analytic philosophical theology by David Bentley Hart, *The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 123–42. In the same section, Hart explains why God must be simple, infinite actuality. For further discussion see my *Proofs of God: Classical Arguments from Tertullian to Barth* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016).
sustain the thick description of the distinctive activity of divine persons that we find in the New Testament. Hasker repeatedly cites the Son’s suffering on the cross as an example, since the church fathers denied that the Father suffered. Yet he strangely does not seem to notice that many of the fathers placed a heavy emphasis on the fact that the Son suffered as man. Many of the acts that Hasker identifies as evidence for three distinct divine personalities flow from the theology of the incarnation: these acts belong to the Son, but they belong to him by virtue of his humanity. Hasker seems unaware that the fathers did not attribute a simple convergence between the human acts of the incarnate Son and the Son’s acts. When Jesus wept, this does not mean that the divine person of the Son became sad, except precisely insofar as the Son became sad in his humanity. When Jesus willed to go to the cross, this does not mean that the divine person of the Son demonstrated a volition distinct from that of the Father, except insofar as the Son’s humanity is not the Father’s. What is needed is a way of accounting for the creature-Creator relation in the incarnation itself. The fact that the change is on the side of the creature does not take away from the intimacy of the incarnation. The Son must remain pure act, after all, if there is to be an incarnation at all—as Thomas Weinandy has rightly emphasized in various works.89

The biblical testimony to distinct divine personalities—Father, Son, Spirit—thus need not mean all that Hasker takes it to mean. The New Testament can describe the Son’s incarnate suffering, or the Father’s voice speaking, or the Spirit’s descending like a dove without us thereby assuming that these economic manifestations must translate into three persons in the sense of three distinct centers of consciousness. John Zizioulas articulates the alternative, with which I agree: “The Trinitarian persons are not to be understood as subjects of consciousness, since they possess but one will, mind etc. both ad intra and ad extra.”90 What this means is not that the divine persons lack subjectivity, but rather that the persons, who are one God, possess this in a manner that is beyond our comprehension and that would be undermined


90. Zizioulas, “Trinitarian Freedom,” 206. Likewise, Brian Daley, SJ, remarks that “the Holy Trinity is not a committee, or even a community, of three persons with three consciousnesses, three minds, and three wills” (Daley, “Conclusion: A God in Whom We Live: Ministering the Trinitarian God,” in Anatolios, Holy Trinity in the Life of the Church, 217–31, at 226).
(not aided) by any denial of the unity and simplicity of the divine mind, will, and so forth.⁹¹

Yet Hasker’s point goes deeper. Who, after all, would suppose that Jesus came to reveal three subsisting relations in God? If all we can say about the distinction between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is that they are distinct in their relation of origin, then Christian worship of the Trinity seems to have been gutted of content from the outset.

When we do not conceive of the Holy Spirit as a distinct center of consciousness in a discursively I-thou relationship with the Father and the Son, we appear to have taken the vital dramatic texture out of pneumatology.

In response to this concern, I note the importance of affirming that the names “Love” and “Gift” are descriptive of the Spirit’s personal properties in the Trinity. Dramatically, these names are hardly worthless, once they have been rightly understood. Contemporary thinkers such as Jean-Luc Marion have shown that these two names may serve to set forth an ontology and indeed an entire understanding of creation and redemption.⁹² If the action of the Holy Spirit in the economy is that of hypostatized “Love” and “Gift,” this opens up plenty of theo-drama, as indeed we find in Scripture. The eschatological Spirit pours himself out upon us and configures the church to the radical Love and Gift that characterize the Spirit-filled Messiah. Thus Thérèse of Lisieux can beg Jesus, with allusions to our participation in Christ’s passion and to the sacrificial offerings of Israel, “let me be this happy victim; consume Your holocaust with the fire of Your Divine Love!”; and she discovers that “love comprised all vocations.”⁹³ Toward the very end of her life, she affirms that “everything is a grace” and that, in her life, “everyone will see that everything comes from God” as “a gratuitous gift from God.”⁹⁴ To name the Spirit personal “Love” and “Gift” in the Trinity is to invite entry into a highly personal, dramatic mystery of inexhaustible communion.

Yet, at the same time, these names retain a spareness that I find salutary. While we know that the persons of the Trinity are distinct, and while this is made clear by the very fact of personal names, nonetheless what individual personhood means in the Trinity is utterly beyond our ken. It is a mystery

91. This point could assist Khaled Anatolios’s insights in his “Personhood, Communion, and the Trinity in Some Patristic Texts.”
94. Ibid., 266–67.
that is caught up in the revealed order of origin, and that is recognizable, very partially, through meditation on personal properties that befit the order of origin. The persons are unique and individual. But they are not distinct from one another in any easily understandable way, or else they would be three gods. Although surely they do not lack subjectivity, they are distinguished via a mystery above that of knowledge, will, being, and suchlike; their distinction flows from relations of origin in the communication of the divine essence that do not render the essence distinct in the persons. Their distinction flows from a relationality that goes deeper than any relationality that we can imagine or conceive. But how can they have true relationality if they cannot be conceived as distinct centers of consciousness? The answer to this question is found in the answer to precisely how they can be transcendentally one in the fullest and most simple way, yet utterly (and nonquantitatively) three. In short, the answer eludes us. We must be content with glimpsing this revealed relationality; and as I hope to show in the chapters that follow, we can do this with respect to the Holy Spirit by meditating upon the names “Holy Spirit,” “Love,” and “Gift.” Surely this trinitarian relationality somehow includes, in a supereminent form, all that we find valuable in human relationality. But depicting the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as three centers of being and consciousness lacks the necessary apophaticism and metaphysical caution due to “the blessed and only Sovereign” who “dwells in unapproachable light” (1 Tim. 6:15–16).

My appreciation for the names “Love” and “Gift” also helps to explain why I do not follow Coakley’s approach. Recall that Coakley, indebted to Pseudo-Dionysius and reading Christian Platonism through her own distinctive feminist lens, emphasizes “desire” as the path into trinitarian naming, both through the prayerful purgation of desire by the Spirit, and through the Spirit’s incorporation of desiring humans into the divine “desire.” Coakley wishes to undercut the linear procession models in which the Spirit seems an overly passive and rather third-rate addition to the work that the Father and Son have already done. In the linear models, it seems that the Spirit comes on the scene after the real, or at least the main, salvific work has been done.

For my part, I affirm the value of the linear models (John and Luke), even while appreciating the attention that Coakley gives to what she terms the Pauline incorporative model of the Spirit’s work. The linear models reveal the eternal order of origin, which is a central aspect of the mystery of the Trinity. Among the coequal persons, there is an order of origin, and indeed they are distinguished by relative opposition in this order of origin. The fact that there is a nontemporal order in the communication of the divine essence—Father-Son-Spirit—is one of the main things that the New Testament
teaches us about the Trinity. Even though God is supremely one, there is relationality in God constituted by an order of origin in the communication of the divine essence. The primacy of the Father is seen in John 1, where we learn that the Word “was in the beginning with God; all things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made” (John 1:2–3). God makes all things through the Word; this indicates the primacy of the Father, a primacy that does not undercut the divinity of the Word ("the Word was God" [John 1:1]). The relationship Father-Son likewise indicates the Father’s primacy, since a son is begotten by a father. Hasker makes this point well, drawing upon Hebrews 1:5 and other texts from John’s Gospel.

It seems to me that the linear model fits quite well with the incorporative model. As Coakley notes, an emphasis on the Holy Spirit’s incorporative work characterizes Romans 8: “When we cry, ‘Abba! Father!’ it is the Spirit himself bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God, and if children, then heirs, heirs of God and fellow heirs with Christ” (Rom. 8:15–17). The Spirit enables us to cry out for the Father and thereby shows that we have been made sons and daughters in the Son. The Spirit incorporates us into the Son and enables us to approach the Father as his children. This does not seem so different from the linear model, in which the Spirit comes to dwell in us with the result that the Father and Son also indwell us (John 14:17, 23). Although I can see the difference between the two models, they appear complementary to me. The emphasis on the order of origin—one on the Father begetting the Son and the Father (and Son) spirating the Spirit—enhances the incorporative

95. Jean-Miguel Garrigues argues that the trinitarian order is “a pure order of origin without anteriority and posteriority, whether of nature, of time or even of reason” (Garrigues, Le Saint-Esprit sceau de la Trinité, 228). Garrigues excludes logical anteriority and posteriority on the grounds that the “Father” always, even logically, requires a “Son.” It seems to me, however, that some kind of logical anteriority and posteriority is required; otherwise, it hardly seems possible to maintain (as Garrigues very much wishes to do) the monarchy and fontality of the Father.

96. Emmanuel Durand emphasizes in this regard that the Father “is relative to the Son and to the Spirit. Even if the name of Father does not formally and directly consignify more than the Son, the hypostasis of the Father is no less relative to the Spirit than to the Son” (Durand, “Perichoresis,” 185–86). For Durand, “considering the Father-Son relation as completed in itself leads to a subordination of the Spirit in reference to the Father-Son pair” (ibid., 186–87). I would say that the Father-Son relation is complete in itself, but not in the sense of being separable from the Father/Son-Holy Spirit relation. As Aquinas remarks, following Augustine, “the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but one who breathes forth Love” (Summa theologiae I, q. 43, a. 5, ad 2). Gilles Emery, OP, comments in this regard, “One cannot fully grasp the begetting if one thinks only in terms of the relation of Father and Son, for the begetting of the Son cannot be detached from the procession of the Holy Spirit” (Emery, Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 390).
model by showing us that our unexpected entrance into the divine life means not pure relationality but an ordered relationality.

In my view, the ordered relationality that the linear model shows us does not require (even if the New Testament may have originally allowed for, as Hurtado claims) a subordination of Son and Spirit. Coming second or third in an atemporal order does not lessen the place of the Son or Holy Spirit, not least because of the evident centrality of the Spirit’s coming in the economy of salvation as lived out by believers: “When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth” (John 16:13). Put another way, ordered relationality does not necessitate subordination in the Trinity, because of the perfection of the communication of all that God is: “All that the Father has is mine [the Son’s]” and the Spirit “will take what is mine and declare it to you” (John 16:14–15). The perfection of the processions means that all that the Father has, the Son and the Holy Spirit also have. We are incorporated into the trinitarian life when we come to share in this life in a manner that befits its pattern of ordered relationality.

Coakley’s emphasis on desire will not be rejected by an admirer of Dionysius, as I certainly am. Dionysius refuses to name God “agapē” without also naming God “eros.” Recall how Dionysius describes God as “yearning on the move, simple, self-moved, self-acting, preexistent in the Good, flowing out from the Good onto all that is and returning once again to the Good.” Even so, another admirer of Dionysius, Thomas Aquinas, offers some helpful qualifications. Discussing love as a passion, though without referring explicitly to eros and agapē, Aquinas states in the prima-secundae pars of the Summa theologiae that the term “love” (amor) possesses “a wider signification” than the terms “dilection” (dilectio) and “charity” (caritas). He explains that “every dilection or charity is love, but not vice versa.” This is so because “dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand,” which means that dilectio, unlike amor, can be only in the will, not in the

97. Commenting on the way in which the revelation of the Spirit differs from the revelation of the Son in the New Testament, Robert Sokolowski observes, “This anonymity of the Spirit is somehow necessary; there must be someone with the authority to reveal the Son and, through the Son, the Father, but that person must remain hidden and ought not to declare himself. . . . He is, after all, the Spirit and not the Word; he is an agent of truth in a manner different from the Son. The Son has said everything that needs to be said, but the Spirit brings it to life” (Sokolowski, “The Revelation of the Holy Trinity: A Study in Personal Pronouns,” in Christian Faith and Human Understanding: Studies on the Eucharist, Trinity, and the Human Person [Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2006], 131–48, at 147).


99. I-II, q. 26, a. 3.

100. I-II, q. 26, a. 3.
concupiscible passion.\textsuperscript{101} For its part, \textit{caritas} involves a perfection of \textit{amor}, rather than \textit{amor} per se.

In question 20 of the \textit{prima pars} of the \textit{Summa}, Aquinas asks whether “amor” is in God. Answering in the affirmative, he distinguishes love from “desire,” which regards “good as not yet possessed.”\textsuperscript{102} But he also makes clear that love in a certain sense encompasses desire, since love “regards good universally, whether possessed or not,” so that “love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite.”\textsuperscript{103} Love is the root of desire to possess a good, and love is the root of joy in possessing a good. Since desire implies lack of a good, however, desire can be attributed to God only metaphorically: God’s love embraces the Good (God himself) in which nothing is lacking. If there were any lack in God, then God could not be supremely actual love and the center of all desire.\textsuperscript{104}

Yet the divine \textit{eros} that Dionysius has in view—“yearning on the move, simple, self-moved, self-acting, preexistent in the Good, flowing out from the Good”—is not rejected by Aquinas. Citing book 4 of \textit{The Divine Names}, Aquinas shows in question 6 of the \textit{prima pars} that God is supremely good because supremely desirable.\textsuperscript{105} And in the first question of the \textit{tertia pars}, Aquinas again cites book 4 of \textit{The Divine Names} so as to indicate the fittingness of the incarnation: “it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others,” and it is therefore fitting that God share himself “in the highest manner” with his rational creatures.\textsuperscript{106} This is indeed the “yearning on the move, simple, self-moved, self-acting, preexistent in the Good, flowing out from the Good” that Dionysius envisions. Even if “desire” can be applied to God only metaphorically, the divine goodness and love encompass the ecstatic gifting and selfless outpouring that Dionysius names by means of “desire.” As Pope Benedict XVI puts it in his encyclical \textit{Deus caritas est}, “God’s \textit{eros} for man is also totally \textit{agape}.”\textsuperscript{107}

This is a roundabout way of getting to my point, which is that “Love” and “Gift,” as names of the Spirit, provide a richer and clearer way of describing the incorporative work of the Spirit than does “desire.” Without rejecting

\textsuperscript{101} I-I, q. 26, a. 3.
\textsuperscript{102} I, q. 20, a. 1.
\textsuperscript{103} I, q. 20, a. 1.
\textsuperscript{104} See I, q. 20, a. 2. In relation to creatures, God’s love is causal: God gives a finite participation in his goodness and thereby enables the creature to be.
\textsuperscript{105} I, q. 6, a. 1.
\textsuperscript{107} Pope Benedict XVI, \textit{Deus caritas est} (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2006), §10.
Coakley’s emphasis on desire, I think that we can say much the same thing—and say it more precisely and within a fuller context—by attending to the names “Love” and “Gift.” Coakley, of course, is attempting what she terms a “théologie totale” in which her reading of the Trinity in terms of desire seeks to underscore that “no trinitarian language is innocent of sexual, political, and ecclesiastical overtones and implications.” My book is not this kind of “théologie totale,” but I seek to name the Holy Spirit in a manner whose “overtones and implications” befit the Gift of Love I have experienced within the body of Christ, in which we are called to “know the love of Christ which surpasses knowledge” and to “be filled with all the fullness of God” (Eph. 3:19).

If neither social trinitarianism (not least in its analytic-theology mode) nor the dynamics of eros alone seems suited to unfolding the theology of the Holy Spirit, what about the third popular contemporary approach, set forth by Weinandy? Here the goal is to give the Spirit an active work within the Trinity and thereby to be more faithful to our experience of the Spirit as an active, fully personal agent in the world. Insisting upon “the Spirit’s mutual infusion in Son and Father,” Coakley agrees with Weinandy’s point that (in her words) “there can be in God’s trinitarian ontology no Sonship which is eternally ‘sourced’ by ‘Father’ in the Spirit.” She disagrees, however, with Weinandy’s blaming Neoplatonic emanationism and Aristotelian epistemology for the inability of theologians prior to the twentieth century to think outside the traditional order of origin. In a formulation that I expect

108. Coakley, *God, Sexuality, and the Self*, 308. From a liberationist perspective, Miguel H. Díaz argues that “a theology of God that does not attend to issues of human liberation, a trinitarian theology unable to challenge oppressive human experiences that cause death, does not reveal the life-giving mystery of God. . . . God who is for us (Father), from us (Son), and permanently among us (Holy Spirit) is mysterium liberationis” (Díaz, “The Life-Giving Reality of God from Black, Latin American, and US Hispanic Theological Perspectives,” in Phan, *The Cambridge Companion to the Trinity*, 259–72, at 269). Díaz’s theology of the Trinity is a theology of history: “The doctrine of the Trinity is a signpost that points to God’s mystery as a life-giving triune presence in history. . . . This one history neither ‘hyper-inflates’ human realities nor focuses on the ‘immanent’ reality of God to the detriment of God’s historical mediations. History, especially the history of liberation from racial, socio-economic, and cultural oppressive human experiences, is the exterior manifestation of the triune life of grace, just as conversely this triune life is the intrinsic presupposition and perfection of that history (that for the sake of which history exists)” (ibid., 259, 261–62). What would it take to produce a trinitarian theology able “to challenge oppressive human experiences that cause death”? Oppressive human experiences and death stem from a lack of unity in love, and from a lack of holiness (sin). Thus a trinitarian theology that challenges oppressive experiences should have a central place for love, unity, and the gift of holiness. Love also prompts the desire to know the life-giving God who reveals himself, and Díaz’s way of naming this God—“for us (Father), from us (Son), and permanently among us (Holy Spirit)”—is inadequate.

Weinandy would find to his liking, she states, “The deeper problem lies in rightly locating the intrinsic role of the Spirit in the Father-Son relationship.”

Recall that Weinandy considers that just as the Father and Son have active roles in the Trinity, so must the Spirit, in order to be fully a coequal divine person. The Father begets and spirates; the Son spirates; but the Spirit (as traditionally understood) has no active role in the production of another divine person. Weinandy states, “The Spirit is merely the Love or Gift shared by the Father and the Son. It is therefore difficult to see why, in the Western conception of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit is a distinct person or subject—a who.” Given the conditions that Weinandy sets here, it would be difficult to see why, in the traditional Eastern conception of the Trinity, either the Son or the Spirit is a distinct person. Only the Father would be such, since in the traditional Eastern view only the Father is responsible for the production of another divine person. To prevent misunderstanding, it is worth reiterating here that contemporary Orthodox theologians such as Paul Evdokimov and Olivier Clément have advocated trinitarian theologies similar to Weinandy’s.

When Weinandy turns to the trinitarian theology that I profess, then, he thinks that the Spirit’s names of “Love” and “Gift” are too passive for full personhood. He appreciates the emphasis on relationality and agrees that the divine persons are distinguished by their mutual relations. In his view, however, “the persons subsist not only in opposition to one another, but also in complementarity to one another. They consummate one another.” He underscores this point with respect to his own view of the Trinity: “Because each of the persons now actively plays a role in determining the subjectivity of the others, they complement one another.” He credits the complementarity of the persons, in fact, to the activity of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is involved in making the Son “Son” and the Father “Father.” Weinandy affirms, “By being the one in whom the Father begets the Son and so is Father for the Son, and by being the one in whom the Son is begotten and so is Son for the Father, the Holy Spirit subsists as the source of their complementarity.” The relations of opposition that constitute the Father and Son are made complementary relations by the Spirit’s activity.

110. Ibid., 333n34.
111. Weinandy, Father’s Spirit of Sonship, 8.
112. Ibid., 82.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid., 83.
115. In its 1995 document “The Greek and Latin Traditions regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit,” the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity makes an argument that, in certain ways, is similar to Weinandy’s perspective: “It is in the Spirit that this relationship between
As Weinandy points out, indeed, “Love” and “Gift” are “less than subjective or personal names,” especially by comparison with “Father” and “Son.” Weinandy nonetheless accepts the fact that the name “Holy Spirit” is less personal than “Father” or “Son,” on the grounds that the Spirit gains his distinct subsistence via the activity of being the one in whom the Father and the Son are related. While the Holy Spirit is not merely passive, the Holy Spirit does the Father and the Son itself attains its Trinitarian perfection. Just as the Father is characterized as Father by the Son he generates, so does the Spirit, by taking his origin from the Father, characterize the Father in the manner of the Trinity in relation to the Son and characterizes the Son in the manner of the Trinity in his relation to the Father: in the fullness of the Trinitarian mystery they are Father and Son in the Holy Spirit.” For this text, see http://www.ewtn.com/library/curia/pccufilq.htm. I can agree with the Pontifical Council insofar as its aim is to affirm the ineffable richness and perfection of trinitarian perichoresis. David Coffey argues in light of this text that “the Son draws his being entirely and exclusively from the Father and not at all from the Holy Spirit. Any and all suggestion of a Spirituque must be resolutely rejected as antithetical to authentic Christian doctrine. But at the same time the fullness of the relationship between the Father and the Son cannot be understood or appreciated without an affirmation of the Holy Spirit who, as their mutual love, exists between them” (Coffey, “Did You Receive the Holy Spirit When You Believed?” Some Basic Questions for Pneumatology [Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2005], 66). I agree in rejecting “all suggestion of a Spirituque,” and it is also true that the Son cannot be understood fully without the Spirit, since the Son is a Word who breathes forth Love. But I think that Coffey’s way of describing “the relationship between the Father and Son” and his conception of the Spirit as existing “between them” fall into anthropomorphism. The relationship of the Spirit to the Father and the Son needs to be approached more cautiously. Coffey contrasts the “proces-sion model” (Father-Son-Spirit) with the “return model” (Father-Spirit-Son) and argues that the latter “deals with the fullness of life and relationships that obtains among the three persons” (ibid., 67; cf. 79). In my view, the latter oversteps the bounds of what we can know. For Coffey, “if the Son is the self-communication of the Father simpliciter, the Holy Spirit is the self-communication of the Father to the Son. . . . The Holy Spirit is the divine person who mediates the Father and the Son to each other in mediated immediacy” (ibid., 98, 102). Commenting on Coffey’s earlier distinction between a “procession model” and a “bestowal model” (an earlier version of the “return model”), Ralph Del Colle argues in favor of Coffey’s position:

Incarnation and anointing are the appropriate terms for the procession and bestowal models, respectively. In the traditional procession model the Holy Spirit is offered (only to believers, this being exclusive of Jesus, on whom it is simply bestowed); in the bestowal model the Spirit is in reality “bestowed.” In the procession model no significant role is assigned to the Holy Spirit in the incarnation. In the bestowal model Jesus is anointed to divine sonship with the Holy Spirit. In the procession model the Son is co-principle of the Holy Spirit, while in the bestowal model the bestowing of the Holy Spirit is alternatively carried out by the Father upon the Son and then by the Son upon the Father. . . . In sum, in the anointing theology of Coffey, the Father anoints Jesus with the Holy Spirit to divine sonship, this being identical with the incarnation. (Del Colle, Chist and the Spirit: Spirit-Christology in Trinitarian Perspective [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994], 124)

The problem here is anthropomorphism, which the procession model avoids; once the missions are factored in, the procession model is hardly as deficient as Coffey and Del Colle suggest.

116. Weinandy, Father’s Spirit of Sonship, 83.
remain somewhat “hidden” or translucent within the Trinity, because his role is relationally oriented toward the Father and Son: his role is “to substantiate or person the Father and the Son for one another.”117 In the Trinity, the Spirit seeks to make the Father and Son manifest, just as the Spirit does in the economy of salvation.

I question, however, whether the Spirit needs an active role in the communication of the divine essence in order to be a coequal divine person. If every divine person needed an active role, then the divine person who is most active would be the greatest. Assuming Weinandy to be correct, the Father would be active in producing the Son and Spirit; the Spirit would be active in making the Father to be “Father” and the Son to be “Son”; and the Son would be active in producing the Spirit. Unless I have missed an active role of the Son, it would seem as though the Spirit is now the most active—or perhaps the Father is still most active. The Son now appears to be the least active. The point is that productive activity is not what makes a coequal divine person.

In addition, I do not see why the Spirit need be active in begetting the Son, as though the Father-Son relation were not sufficient. The rejection of a nontemporal order of origin seems a heavy price to pay for attempting to equalize the productive activity of all the divine persons. The Father’s unbegetten paternity, his personal property to which Scripture repeatedly testifies, seems to be rendered meaningless once we suppose that the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and Son, is present “already” in the begetting of the Son. Why talk as though the Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son, if the Spirit is there in the begetting of the Son? If the Spirit is present in the Son’s eternal begetting, how can we also posit that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the begotten Son—proceeds from the begotten one in whose begetting he already acts?

Puzzles such as this would force us to abandon utterly the order of origin, and would render nonsensical any talk about the processions. It will not do to say that the Spirit proceeds from a divine person whom that same Spirit helps to beget; this puts an end to any intelligible talk about an order in the processions, and indeed to any intelligible talk about the processions themselves as constitutive of divine persons. Instead, one is left with a purely circular Trinity in which no one person is productive of any other person, since production requires at least some kind of intelligible (atemporal) priority. It also renders obsolete the notion of relative opposition as constitutive of persons, because (as Weinandy recognizes) the Spirit’s “complementary” role now makes the

117. Ibid., 84.
Father to be “Father,” in a way that the Father-Son relative opposition apparently cannot do.

Ultimately, the usefulness of the order-of-origins model, rooted in processions and relations, is evacuated by Weinandy’s additions to that model. The fundamental mistake consists in supposing that each person needs an active productive role in order to be a coequal person. This might be the case if the divine persons were like human persons, although even here it seems to me that human dignity and coequality do not depend upon a certain level of activity. But the divine persons are not coequal by reason of what they do in the order of origin. They are coequal persons because they are distinct relations in God, and therefore are subsisting relations, fully divine. To describe the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as subsisting relations makes them sound quite different from anything that we encounter in our productive lives; and so they are. The persons are relations that do not impair perfect transcendental unity. They are a divine communion that is the one God. Their relationality is ordered to one another, in the order of origin that involves no temporal priority but is an order nonetheless.

The Eschatological Spirit

Examining the biblical depiction of the Spirit’s work, Rodrigo Morales observes, “Although the Spirit of God plays various roles in the prophetic literature of the OT, perhaps the most dominant theme taken up by the early Christian movement is the eschatological outpouring of the Spirit.”

118 This Old Testament theme of the Spirit’s eschatological outpouring appears, for example, in Ezekiel. Ezekiel’s prophecies unite two senses of “restoration”:

118. Rodrigo J. Morales, The Spirit and the Restoration of Israel: New Exodus and New Creation Motifs in Galatians (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 13. Indebted to E. P. Sanders, Morales defines “restoration eschatology” and “restoration of Israel” as follows:

With regard to the OT Prophets and later Second Temple Jewish literature, the terms refer to the expectation that God would finally act to bring the tribes of Israel back to the land, sometimes under a Davidic ruler—in other words, he would restore Israel to its former glory. With respect to Paul, the terms describe the apostle’s conviction that God had begun to fulfill his promises to redeem Israel through the death and resurrection of Jesus. . . . Unlike the authors of texts such as the Psalms of Solomon, Paul did not expect a nationalistic return of the tribes of Israel to the land under an earthly Davidic ruler. Nevertheless, he did believe that through the cross and the outpouring of the Spirit God had begun to fulfill the promises spoken through the prophets. Indeed, though Paul’s message of the cross was not at all clear from the writings of the OT (as though Jesus’s death on the cross were the obvious solution that all first-century Jews would have expected), Paul’s emphasis on the phenomenon of the Spirit makes the most sense in light of eschatological expectations that frequently appear in the context of a hope for the restoration of Israel. (ibid., 10–11)
the people will be restored to the land of Israel, and they will be spiritually restored and renewed. It is the latter sense that most clearly involves the Spirit. Thus the Lord promises, “I will take you from the nations, and gather you from the all the countries, and bring you into your own land. I will sprinkle clean water upon you, and you shall be clean from all your uncleannesses, and from all your idols I will cleanse you. A new heart I will give you, and a new spirit I will put within you” (Ezek. 36:24–26). Through the prophetic image of the valley of dry human bones, Ezekiel goes on to show that the people will be created anew by God’s breath, just as the breath of God created the first man (Gen. 2:7). This vision of restoration combines a return to the land and a return from spiritual death: “I will bring you home into the land of Israel. And you shall know that I am the LORD, when I open your graves, and raise you from your graves, O my people. And I will put my Spirit within you, and you shall live” (Ezek. 37:12–14). Furthermore, at the same time that the people receive God’s Spirit, they will be ruled by one Davidic king and no longer be separated into two kingdoms. The Lord explains, “I will make a covenant of peace with them; it shall be an everlasting covenant with them; and I will bless them and multiply them, and will set my sanctuary in the midst of them for evermore” (Ezek. 37:26).

This restoration of Israel through the coming of God’s Spirit and a Davidic king is presented in different ways elsewhere in the prophets. Its roots are found in the covenantal relationship of God with Abraham, and in the renewal and deepening of this covenant at Mount Sinai. Moses tells the Israelites that the Lord “loved your fathers and chose their descendants after them, and brought you out of Egypt with his own presence” (Deut. 4:37). God did this for no reason other than his love; his covenant and his saving acts are gifts of his love. Moses


120. Joseph Blenkinsopp comments, “While the major prophetic books have little to say about the spirit, for Ezekiel, as for primitive prophecy, it is the decisive agent, being not only the principle of movement and renewal but the dynamic factor in prophetic possession” (Blenkinsopp, *A History of Prophecy in Israel: From the Settlement in the Land to the Hellenistic Period* [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1983], 204). Yet Blenkinsopp’s reading of Ezekiel 37 is rather dull, seeing in it only a portrait of a community that “has lost its will to survive” and “is vivified by the spirit activated through the word of God addressed to the community” (ibid.). See also the relevant passages in Blenkinsopp, *Ezekiel* (Louisville: John Knox, 1990). On the apocalyptic eschatology of Ezekiel 38–39, see Stephen L. Cook, *Prophecy and Apocalypticism: The Post-Exilic Social Setting* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 85–121.
reminds the people of Israel, “For you are a people holy to the Lord your God; the Lord your God has chosen you to be a people for his own possession, out of all the peoples that are on the face of the earth. It was not because you were more in number than any other people that the Lord set his love upon you and chose you . . . but it is because the Lord loves you” (Deut. 7:6–8). Because God has established this covenantal relationship of love with Israel, the people are called to know and love God, and to love one another. Through Moses, God commands Israel, “You shall be holy; for I the Lord your God am holy . . . . You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Lev. 19:2, 18), and “Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God is one Lord, and you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might” (Deut. 6:4–5).

God loves Israel, and each Israeliite must love God and neighbor.

The context of covenantal love explains why a “restoration” is needed and sought. In fact, a “restoration” is sought almost from the outset of Israel’s Scriptures. Consider Genesis 6, which reports that at the same time that “men began to multiply on the face of the ground” (Gen. 6:1), sin multiplied too, so that “the earth was corrupt in God’s sight, and the earth was filled with violence. And God saw the earth, and behold, it was corrupt; for all flesh had corrupted their way upon the earth” (Gen. 6:11–12). The time before Noah was marked by the fact that “every imagination of the thoughts of his [man’s] heart was only evil continually” (Gen. 6:5). After the flood, the same alienation persisted: Noah got drunk and his son Ham “saw the nakedness of his father” (Gen. 9:22). The men of Babel sought to “make a name” for themselves by building “a tower with its top in the heavens” (Gen. 11:4), repeating the desire of Adam and Eve to seize divinity for themselves, in response to the serpent’s temptation, “your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil” (Gen. 3:5).

Yet, despite human wickedness and alienation from God, God does not give up on humans—as is shown first by God’s clothing Adam and Eve after their fall (Gen. 3:21), notwithstanding the pain, hardship, and death to which they have made themselves subject. After the flood, the rainbow stands as God’s covenant with all creation (Gen. 9). But it is especially through his covenantal relationship with Abraham and his descendents that God works to restore

humans from the state of sinful alienation. The law given to Moses, in this light, was not a mere legal code; rather, it was an act of love and a path of life. As the psalmist implores God, “Lead me in the path of your commandments, for I delight in it. Incline my heart to your testimonies, and not to gain! Turn my eyes from looking at vanities; and give me life in your ways” (Ps. 119:35–37). Since it remains the case that sinfulness overcomes humans, however, the psalmist laments, “The Lord looks down from heaven upon the children of men, to see if there are any that act wisely, that seek after God. They have all gone astray, they are all alike corrupt; there is none that does good, no, not one” (Ps. 14:2–3); and Isaiah echoes, “Behold, the Lord’s hand is not shortened, that it cannot save, or his ear dull, that it cannot hear; but your iniquities have made a separation between you and your God, and your sins have hid his face from you. . . . The Lord saw it, and it displeased him that there was no justice” (Isa. 59:1–2, 15). Given this situation of alienation, Isaiah prophesies restoration. The Lord promises through Isaiah, “I will pour my Spirit upon your descendants, and my blessing on your offspring” (Isa. 44:3). Isaiah says of God’s Servant, “I have put my Spirit upon him, he will bring forth justice to the nations. . . . He will not fail or be discouraged till he has established justice in the earth; and the coastlands wait for his law” (Isa. 42:1, 4). The result will be the restoration and redemption of Israel and indeed of all the nations.

The eschatological outpouring of the Spirit foretold by the prophets will overcome idolatry and injustice. This can be accomplished interiorly only by an infusion of love, so that the people of God truly become able to “love the Lord your God with all your heart” and to “love your neighbor as yourself.” It is no wonder that Jesus identifies these as the two greatest commandments  

(see Mark 12:29–31), and that the scribe, with whom Jesus is in conversation, agrees with him. The letters of Paul, which testify joyfully to the eschatological outpouring of the Spirit, depict the Spirit’s outpouring as a gift of love. Rejoicing that “we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ,” Paul proclaims that “God’s love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us” (Rom. 5:1, 5). Through this gift of love, the Spirit unites us to God in such a way that nothing “will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus” (Rom. 8:39). Paul makes clear that the eschatological outpouring of the Spirit enables us to fulfill the law—to avoid idolatry and injustice—precisely by enabling us interiorly to love God and neighbor: “Love does no wrong to a neighbor; therefore love is the fulfilling of the law” (Rom. 13:10). As Graham Tomlin points out, the eschatological kingdom “is the kingdom of the love of God,” and it is “what happens when the Spirit comes.”

Elsewhere Paul states that “the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control” (Gal. 5:22–23). It is because God loves us that he has given us the Spirit: “He destined us in love to be his sons through Jesus Christ” (Eph. 1:5), and he did so “out of the great love with which he loved us, even when we were dead through our trespasses” (Eph. 2:4–5). Hearing and believing in the gospel, we have been “sealed with the promised Holy Spirit, who is the guarantee of our inheritance until we acquire possession of it” (Eph. 1:13–14). Strengthened by the indwelling Spirit and by faith in Christ, we are “rooted and grounded in love” and come to “know the love of Christ which surpasses knowledge, that you may be filled with all the fulness of God” (Eph. 3:17, 19). Paul prays for his flock that “your love may abound more and more, with knowledge and discernment” (Phil. 1:9). The Spirit’s gift of love is profoundly unitive: “So if there is any encouragement in Christ, any incentive of love, any participation in the Spirit, any affection

123. See Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 493–98.
124. Fee comments on Romans 13:8–10, “There is no direct reference or allusion to the Spirit in this paragraph. I include it here because it is another of many texts that presuppose the Spirit without mentioning him. The connections are obvious: In 8:4 Paul has argued that those who ‘walk in the Spirit’ thus ‘fulfill’ the ‘righteous requirement of the Law.’ Having begun the general paraenesis dealing with relationships with the word that ‘love must be sincere’ (12:9), Paul now tells them that the love-command, which ‘sums up’ all other commands, is precisely how the ‘righteous requirement of Torah’ is ‘fulfilled.’ Thus in 14:15 the one who disregards a brother or sister on the issue of food is ‘not walking in love.’ Not only so, but in Gal. 5:22 this love that ‘fulfills’ Torah is expressly designated as the ‘fruit of the Spirit’ (cf. Rom. 15:30), whose very existence puts one in a sphere where Law no longer pertains. Even though not mentioned in this passage, what is said here about love ‘fulfilling’ the Law is in Pauline understanding a direct outworking of the Holy Spirit in the life of the believer” (ibid., 613).
and sympathy, complete my joy by being of the same mind, having the same love, being in full accord and of one mind” (Phil. 2:1–2). Paul praises the Colossians for their “love in the Spirit” (Col. 1:8), which is evidence of the Spirit’s eschatological work in the Colossian church; they and other Christian churches are “knit together in love” (Col. 2:2).

I have focused here on the Old Testament and Paul in order to emphasize that the root of the naming of the Spirit “Love” and “Gift” is what Jacob Neusner calls the “urgent love between God and Israel, the holy people.” As we saw in the prophets, the Holy Spirit’s characteristics begin to come to light within this covenantal context, which was Paul’s own context within which he encountered the Lord on the road to Damascus. I am persuaded that these characteristics from the salvific economy identify the eternal distinctiveness of the Holy Spirit as the communion of Love of the Father and Son.

The church, of course, is a mixed body whose members often look little like a people who are indwelt by the Holy Spirit. And yet, by the redemptive power of Jesus’s cross and resurrection, the church is being “prepared as a bride adorned for her husband” (Rev. 21:2) by means of Spirit-filled teaching and sacraments. James Dunn observes with regard to the earliest church that alongside the conviction that Jesus had been raised from the dead and exalted to the right hand of God, “The other most striking feature of the earliest days was the vitality of the spiritual experience of the first believers, attributed to the outpouring of the God’s Spirit upon them.” Indeed, the Holy Spirit,


127. Jacob Neusner, Israel’s Love Affair with God: Song of Songs (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1993), 1. Scot McKnight suggests that the “new covenant” hermeneutic must have arisen, sometime after Pentecost, from “the conviction that the pneumatic experience of Pentecost was in fact what was expected by Jeremiah and Ezekiel” (McKnight, “Covenant and Spirit: The Origins of the New Covenant Hermeneutic,” in Stanton, Longenecker, and Barton, Holy Spirit and Christian Origins, 41–54, at 54).

128. As Anne Hunt says, “In terms of our actual experience of the Trinity in salvation history, the Trinity ad extra, it is the Spirit whom we first encounter, the Spirit who is given to us: ‘God’s love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us’ (Rom. 5:5). It is the Holy Spirit who leads us to recognize, and incorporates us into, the mystery of Christ, in and through whom we are made sons and daughters of the Father” (Hunt, “Trinity, Christology, and Pneumatology,” in Phan, The Cambridge Companion to the Trinity, 365–80, at 370).

129. James D. G. Dunn, Christianity in the Making, vol. 2, Beginning from Jerusalem (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 1169. Similarly, Craig S. Keener comments that “the experience of and dependence on the Spirit was pervasive in early Christianity, which was thoroughly charismatic in the general sense of the term. Further, although some Jewish contemporaries sought revelatory experiences, the early Christians were more consistently charismatic than most of
promised by Israel’s God and given by Israel’s crucified, risen, and exalted Messiah, is now poured forth so that we might be made children of God, “a dwelling place of God in the Spirit” (Eph. 2:22) and “knit together in love” (Col. 2:2). This occurs when we are united to Jesus Christ and, in Christ, to the Father; as Yves Congar says, “Although all this is accomplished by the Spirit, it constitutes not the Body of the Spirit, but that of Christ.”

“If we live by the Spirit, let us also walk by the Spirit. Let us have no self-conceit, no provoking of one another, no envy of one another. . . . Bear one another’s burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ” (Gal. 5:25–26; 6:2). “I will be glad and exult in thee, I will sing praise to thy name, O Most High” (Ps. 9:2).

mainstream Judaism; although NT Spirit-language may fail to strike us today due to its familiarity, it radically defined early Christians as the community of the new age” (Keener, The Spirit in the Gospels and Acts: Divine Purity and Power [Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1997], 4). As Keener points out, in Second Temple Judaism the Spirit was linked with purification and inspiration, and these same emphases (along with others) are found in the New Testament. Keener observes that the most distinctive Christian teaching on the Spirit is, not surprisingly, the Spirit’s inseparability from Christ.


131. The present book on the Holy Spirit should be read as a part of an ongoing effort, spiritual as well as intellectual, to overcome what David Tracy calls “the disastrous separation of theology and spirituality along with the modern separation of philosophy and a way of life” (Tracy, “Trinitarian Theology and Spirituality,” 410). On these separations, see also Matthew L. Lamb’s Eternity, Time, and the Life of Wisdom (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2007). For a study of spiritual theology that is also, necessarily, a study of the work of the Holy Spirit, see Edith M. Humphrey, Ecstasy and Intimacy: When the Holy Spirit Meets the Human Spirit (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006).